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The ‘Hormuz Shock,’ China’s 15th FYP, and Guangdong’s Energy Dilemma
This issue brief by Dominik Mierzejewski examines how the Middle East conflict, particularly the disruption of energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, reinforces the strategic logic underpinning China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030). Contrary to analyses that focus primarily on great-power competition or China’s diplomatic posture, the brief argues that the crisis highlights a fundamental challenge for China’s technological modernization agenda: the dependence of advanced industrial development on secure and affordable energy supplies. The author writes that Beijing has responded by strengthening energy security through a combination of domestic fossil-fuel production, renewable-energy expansion, strategic reserves, grid modernization, and regional power-market integration. Particular attention is paid to Guangdong and Southern China, where dependence on imported LNG exposes key centers of advanced manufacturing to external shocks, writes Mierzejewski. Read the brief here.
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Report of the Taiwan-Nordic Forum 2026: Resilience as Defense
The 6th Taiwan-Nordic Forum, titled ‘Resilience as Defense,’ was convened on April 15, 2026, in Stockholm. The forum, organized by the Stockholm Taiwan Center of the Institute for Security and Development Policy, served as a platform for Nordic, Baltic, and Taiwanese experts and scholars to discuss emerging common defense challenges linked to gray-zone tactics in Taiwan, the Nordic, and the Baltic regions. It was the first time the forum extended its scope to Baltic states, marking an important step towards deepening cooperation and promoting knowledge exchange, elements that constitute the cornerstone of strengthened national and international resilience. Read the event report here.
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Beyond Hormuz: Japan’s Strategic Balancing Between Iran and the United States
Anne Weiler writes that Tokyo has successfully navigated a period of heightened U.S.-Iran tensions in the Hormuz crisis, balancing its national priorities without alienating Washington. However, questions remain about the sustainability of this strategy: how long can Japan maintain this delicate balancing act? The next emergency may occur much closer to home, and when it does, Japan will have to decide whether its postwar restraints remain a source of stability or have become a strategic liability, writes Weiler. Read this piece here.
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FACTSHEET: Reading CPEC 2.0 Beyond Connectivity: A Corridor, a Strategy, or a Strategic Dependency?
This ISDP Fact Sheet on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), prepared by the Stockholm Centre for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA), offers a timely reminder that CPEC should no longer be understood merely as an infrastructure initiative. It must be read as the evolving strategic architecture of China’s long-term presence in Pakistan and the wider Indian Ocean region. Beginning as a transport and energy corridor connecting Xinjiang to Gwadar, CPEC has now entered a more complex second phase that emphasizes industrialization, technology, agriculture, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and digital connectivity. This Fact Sheet is a part of the SCSA-IPA's research project titled "The Silk Noose: China's Power Architecture in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region". Read and download it here.
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China’s Strategic Corridor in Pakistan: Progress, Dependency, and the Uncertain Future of CPEC
This Focus Asia paper by Jagannath Panda, Anne Weiler, Sevil Khikmatova, and Tristan Eng analyses that while CPEC Phase I delivered visible gains in roads, energy infrastructure, digital connectivity, and Gwadar Port, it also entrenched structural dependency through mounting debt, political alignment, and reliance on Chinese finance, technology, and security arrangements. Rather than driving broad-based industrial transformation, Phase I exposed Pakistan’s institutional fragility, regional inequalities, and governance challenges. The transition to CPEC Phase II or “CPEC 2.0” marks a strategic shift from large-scale infrastructure financing toward deeper economic integration through Special Economic Zones, green technologies, mining, and private-sector partnerships, write the authors. The paper concludes that CPEC has evolved beyond a development initiative into a long-term mechanism of strategic influence, embedding China within Pakistan’s economic and political architecture and strengthening its broader Eurasian ambitions.
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Innovation Under Fire: Ukraine’s Wartime Adaptation and the Future of European Security
This issue brief by Melita Phachulia argues that Ukraine represents an emerging model of adaptive statehood, in which innovation is continuous, decentralized, and institutionalized through platforms such as BRAVE1 and the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine. Under sustained military and hybrid pressure, governance, technology, industry, and society adapt in parallel, blurring traditional civilian-military boundaries. Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that modern warfare is defined not only by kinetic capabilities but also by the resilience of interconnected digital, industrial, and institutional systems. For Europe, this model offers critical insights into the future of security, where adaptability, cyber resilience, industrial scalability, and cross-sectoral innovation are becoming crucial to strategic stability and collective defense, writes Phachulia. Read the brief here.
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Taiwan’s Labor Shortages in Key Sectors and the Skill Mismatch
Alice Baravelli writes that the labor shortages in Taiwan’s semiconductor sector are the result of multiple interconnected demographic, educational, and cultural factors rather than simply a consequence of demographic decline. Addressing this challenge will require sustained cooperation between government, industry, and educational institutions to better integrate and realign these interconnected dimensions, writes Baravelli. What remains clear is that labor shortages have evolved into a matter of national strategic concern, as they affect the foundation of Taiwan’s economy, its central role in the global semiconductor supply chain, and its broader international standing, writes the author. Read this piece here.
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Maritime Order in Asia: Australia and the Indo-Pacific
On March 31, 2026, the Indo-Pacific Research Centre (IPRC) and the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP) co-organised a special online discussion featuring Professor Bec Strating on the theme of ‘Maritime Order in Asia: Australia and the Indo-Pacific’. This report summarizes Professor Bec Strating’s presentation, which explored Australia’s maritime security agenda. The discussion examined how Australia’s identity as an ocean-dependent state shapes its security outlook across the Indian, Pacific, and Southern Oceans. It further explored Australia’s construction and promotion of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic maritime region amid shifting global power dynamics. In particular, the discussion focused on the context of intensifying the U.S.-China competition, uncertainty in traditional alliances, and the growing importance of middle powers’ engagement. Read the report here.
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Chips, Code, and Control: Rewriting the Economics of Old Tech Wars
This issue brief by Abhivardhan and Jagannath Panda analyses that contemporary techno-geopolitics is no longer a unified “tech cold war,” but a fragmented competition across two distinct domains: semiconductors and artificial intelligence ecosystems. The semiconductor contest is shaped by export controls, manufacturing chokepoints, strategic denial, and industrial subsidies. By contrast, AI ecosystems remain more networked and commercially interoperable through data flows, cloud infrastructure, open-source models, and cross-border talent mobility, argue Abhivardhan and Jagannath Panda. This brief contends that states misread technological competition when they treat chips and AI as a single geopolitical battlefield. Read and download the brief here.
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Pax Silica: AI realigns global power balance
Jagannath Panda writes for The Korea Times that Pax Silica represents something larger than a technology partnership. It reflects the emergence of a new Indo-Pacific strategic logic where semiconductors, cyber systems, digital networks, critical minerals and industrial resilience are becoming central pillars of regional order. The future balance of power in the Indo-Pacific will increasingly be determined not only by military strength but also by who builds the most trusted technological and economic ecosystems, writes Panda. He further writes that the Quad’s continued relevance lies precisely in its ability to adapt to this changing reality. Its success, however, will depend on how effectively it can build durable partnerships beyond its four members. Read this piece in The Korea Times here.