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China, Iran, and the Limits of Strategic Partnership Amid War
Nadeem Ahmed Moonakal writes that the Iran war has exposed the fragility of the Middle East security environment and its direct implications for Asian powers, particularly China. While Beijing has long benefited from a U.S.-led security order, the current escalation highlights the challenges China faces, especially as it continues to refrain from offering any security commitments to Iran, writes Moonakal. China’s ties with Iran remain significant but limited, while its deeper and more diversified partnerships with Gulf states reflect clearer long-term priorities, argues the author. Read and download this brief here.
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Tit for Tat: How Europe Learned to Say “Not Our War”
Shreya Sinha writes that rather than an isolated emotional response to past grievances, Europe’s restraint on Iran is a rational recalibration of how alliances function in a realist world when reciprocity is no longer guaranteed. The Ukraine experience exposed a structural vulnerability at the heart of the transatlantic partnership, indicating that when collective security is treated as selectively applicable, it no longer functions as a credible deterrent for burden-sharing., argues Sinha. She further argues that alliances held together by shared interest, rather than shared values, are nothing but transactional; and transactional arrangements are renegotiated when the terms shift. Read this piece here.
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Encourage Security Debates: Key Allies Are Not Proliferation Risks
Daehan Lee writes on how the debates on nuclear latency and SSNs should not be misread as an attempt to go nuclear or decouple from Washington. Rather, the author argues that they reflect a broader conversation about fairer burden sharing that the United States has long sought to promote. To reorganize alliances into a more lattice-like structure, major allies such as South Korea and Japan must enhance their own capabilities, writes Lee. Hence, such academic and policy discussions are not confined to bilateral alliances alone. They are also closely connected to the foundations of ROK-U.S.–Japan trilateral security cooperation. Read and download the piece here.
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How China and Russia View the Iran War Differently
Jagannath Panda draws a comparison of the Chinese and Russian perspectives on the Iran war. he writes that in reacting to the current crisis, China speaks the language of restraint, mediation, and systemic stability. Russia invokes loyalty, strategic alignment, and geopolitical opportunity. These differences in messaging reflect two fundamentally distinct ways of navigating disorder, writes Panda in The National Interest. He further raises two questions: are China and Russia genuinely aligned in their approach to the Iran War, or are they merely converging tactically while diverging strategically? And what do their differences reveal about the evolving nature of great-power competition in a fragmented global order? Read this piece in The National Interest here.
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China’s Gwadar Gamble: Reshaping Sea–Land Connectivity
China’s maritime resurgence, though relatively recent, reflects a decisive shift from continental preoccupations to expansive sea power ambitions. This issue brief by Mandip Singh examines the evolution of China’s maritime strategy through three interlinked frameworks: the transition from “offshore defense” to “far-seas defense,” the intellectual influence of Mahan and Mackinder, and the operationalization of the Two Oceans Strategy. Central to this transformation is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which integrates economic development with security imperatives. China is expanding naval capabilities, securing critical sea lanes, and developing strategic infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific. Gwadar Port, a flagship component of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), is analyzed as both an economic project and a potential strategic asset, despite its current operational and political challenges. This issue brief argues that China’s sea-land strategy reflects a long-term vision of geopolitical influence, combining maritime power projection with continental connectivity to secure its global interests. Read and download this issue brief here.
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The Zhang Youxia Purge and Taiwan’s Security: Navigating Increased Unpredictability in the Taiwan Strait?
The January 2026 investigations of senior Central Military Commission figures, including Generals Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, have left China’s top military leadership unusually centralized under Xi Jinping. This co-authored issue brief by Niklas Swanström, Yi-Chieh Chen, and Maud Descamps argues that while this disruption in the People’s Liberation Army might suggest reduced operational capacity, it paradoxically increases risks for Taiwan. Leadership purges erode institutional knowledge, fostering miscalculation and unpredictable decision-making,, argued Swanström, Chen, and Descamps. They further write that newly elevated officers may prioritize loyalty and assertiveness, encouraging risk-prone strategies. Read the full brief here.
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Balancing Security and Innovation: A Policy Perspective
This co-authored chapter by Niklas Swanström and Filip Borges Månsson explains how the academic world should balance between security and innovation. This chapter is a part of the Research and Education Security Report, co-authored by a group of mostly European scholars, aims at analyzing and illustrating challenges, but to a degree also opportunities, connected with academia, research conducted by universities and other institutions, exchange of students and scholars, as well as abuses made by nation states benefiting from features of the research and education community. See the chapter and report details here.
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Revisiting the offense-defense balance: drone warfare and Taiwan’s asymmetrical defense strategy
Mark Cogan and Hagannath Panda write for Asian Security that the Chinese activities in the Taiwan Strait have intensified pressure on Taiwan’s defense. Using offensive-defense balance (ODB) theory as an analytical framework, this article evaluates the role of drone warfare in Taiwan’s asymmetric strategy through four indicators derived from Glaser and Kaufmann: cost, territorial goals, optimality, and force employment. It further argues that UAVs can enhance Taiwan’s defensive position by increasing attrition, complicating logistics, and raising uncertainty before conflict. However, this defensive advantage is conditional and requires cost-effective procurement, production resilience, doctrinal adaptation, and the ability to counter PLA countermeasures. Read this article here.