Will Kamala Harris Reignite Dialogue with North Korea if Elected in 2024?
Jagannath Panda
Quid Pro Quo: Will Controlled Dialogue Make a Comeback? In late August, in her nomination acceptance speech, the U.S. Democratic presidential candidate for 2024, Kamala Harris, unequivocally talked about not cozying up to, “tyrants and dictators like Kim Jong-un, who are rooting for Trump.” She was, of course, referring to defending American interests and values in her foreign policy goals. The Kim regime was but an example in the U.S.’s enduring fight against autocracy, as well as maintaining global American leadership.
Moreover, the lack of any mention of “denuclearization” of the Korean Peninsula in the 2024 Democratic Party platform so far highlights that North Korea, on its own, may not necessarily be a concern in this election, nor is its denuclearization considered a feasible option policy-wise. This is a break from the 2020 election when the Democratic platform included “the longer-term goal of denuclearization.”
Nonetheless, even as the omission has raised concerns in some quarters of South Korea, it would be foolhardy to assume that a potential Harris policy would not steer away from the platform’s summary, which only offers a sneak peek into the political thinking. Moreover, this platform seems to have been finalized before Biden stepped down, it assumes Biden returning for a second term, from the race in favor of Harris.
Notwithstanding such nuances, what would a Harris presidency mean for U.S. policy in the Korean Peninsula in general and North Korea in particular?
Would Harris continue with President Joe Biden’s policy of disengagement in tandem with sanctions and military pressure if elected? Or, would she focus more on diplomatic engagement without dialing down on the pressure?
What of the South Korean, for now latent, ambitions to go nuclear?
The Road to Korea Is Paved with Good Intent
It is clear that Biden’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, centered around U.S. allies and partnerships, has been a remarkable success in a relatively short span, from building a high-tech-oriented security partnership with India to upgrading the deterrence-focused, iron-clad alliance with South Korea, as well as strengthening the mini-laterals such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF); particularly for the supply chain resilience.
Vis-à-vis North Korea, the Biden administration adopted what was essentially a hardline stance, though some have called it a pragmatic, and relatively ambivalent but urgent approach to North Korea. This is significant amid the Kim regime’s total distrust of the U.S. and its increasing provocations, from formally abandoning the long-standing goal of peaceful reunification with the South to planning to accelerate military capabilities, including the nuclear arsenal.
Biden has remained focused on extending deterrence to South Korea with the 2023 Washington Declaration, as well as on improving Japan and South Korea ties for an enhanced impact of the trilateral with the U.S. regarding East Asian affairs, with disarmament as a long-term scenario.
However, constructive engagement with the regime has been elusive due to both Biden’s and the conservative South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s lack of a push for either dialogue or negotiations amid Kim’s militarist behavior.
Overall, it makes sense for Harris to look forward in a similar policy trajectory but with the intent to intensify the effectiveness of the “like-minded” coalition in the region, particularly in the fight against an authoritarian China that is looking to upend the liberal world order. As a result, even where North Korea is concerned, the prime focus would in all likelihood be on increasing deterrence and preventing any further escalation.
All Dialogue is Good Dialogue?
Yet, a lack of engagement and increased pressure will only increase the strategic gap between North Korea and the US. Such an isolation of North Korea by the U.S. amid an increasingly fragile security landscape both in the Indo-Pacific and globally will not resolve tensions.
North Korea is a bigger problem today for the United States than it used to be a few years back, as evidenced by its new pact with Russia and growing overtures to another authoritarian regime in Iran. Even as China has maintained a cautious stance where the North Korean-Russian pact is concerned, it will not hesitate to leverage these weaker regimes.
The Harris administration, if elected to office, would likely view the North Korean issue through this integrated lens. Certainly, the near-term goal would be to put a stop to North Korea’s nuclear build-up. So the space for dialogue would have to be created.
Also, even as the goal of “denuclearization” has been deemed dead, including by Kim Jong Un, nuclear diplomacy, arms control, and possibly controlled economic engagement seem a good start to the conversations, at least for the near future.
In this regard, there seems some adjustment in the Yoon government’s hardline approach too. Yoon in his Liberation Day speech in August has opened the doors for an Inter-Korean Working Group. At the same time, he has not abandoned his Audacious Initiative (2022) of introducing political and economic cooperation once North Korea, “takes just one step toward denuclearization.”
Last Hurdles
Such measures also highlight that the Yoon government may be open to a change in tone in line with a potential Harris administration thinking, in part due to fears about losing the extended deterrence if Donald Trump comes to power. A senior Korean government official has raised concerns about the political inadequacies of the foreign policy/security advisors on the Harris team – something for Harris to chew upon.
In the same vein, the new administration would need to fill important vacant posts such as that of the top diplomat for North Korea issues. There is also a reported trend of the Biden administration downgrading such positions or creating dual positions. Such dawdling is simply bad optics and in turn less effective governance.
Last, but not least, Harris would need to manage the expectations of an increasingly insistent South Korea on its nuclear ambitions amid a growing existential threat from North Korea and lack of a total trust in U.S. support. Though the Washington Declaration has outwardly soothed Yoon’s desire to go nuclear, recently, especially after the North Korean-Russia deal, there have been growing calls for reconfiguring South Korea’s nuclear armament options. From such a standpoint, only a freezing of North Korea’s nuclear build-up will not be enough for South Korea.
As a result, even as dialogue may seem a way forward from a global perspective and denuclearization a non-starter, from a South Korean point of view nothing less than nuclear deterrence will possibly do. Harris would need to employ particularly deft, strategic diplomacy to avert a nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and mitigate a common authoritarian challenge including a highly unstable North Korea, a legitimately tough task for any new U.S. administration.
This piece is published first in The National Interest.
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