China-Russia Relations: Where Is the Partnership Limit Between the Two Powers?

Abstract

The intensification of political rapprochement between Russia and China has recently become an important challenge for the global security environment. Differences in their attitudes toward their roles in the geopolitical arena may contribute to an unequal partnership between Russia and China, giving rise to potential threats of misperception in bilateral relations across various spheres. Both countries see themselves as surrounded by weak states with internal instability, whose growth may lead to external spillover, causing insecurity across the region. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, however, has exposed and tested the limits of the “no limit friendship” between Russia and China, showing that their interests do not always coincide. The declaration of boundless partnership against a backdrop of uncertainty regarding each other’s intentions, further exacerbated by inequalities in economic, geopolitical, and military spheres, creates conditions for conflicting geopolitical interests in regions where their spheres of influence overlap. This issue brief analyzes China-Russia relations in the regions where their interests clash most, assesses the intensity of their strategic partnership, and hypothesizes possible scenarios for its future development.

Introduction

The elevation of the China-Russia strategic partnership to the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for the New Era represents a key element of the ongoing trend of political rapprochement between the two countries. The relevance of this process is increasing due to the emergence of new geopolitical players on the international arena who, through the effective utilization and continuous strengthening of their economic and military potential, are capable of influencing the global geopolitical situation. Political rapprochement, however, is a long-term process with substantial historical roots. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR in 1991, a new era began in China-Russia relations. After decades of tense relations between the Soviet Union and China, caused by their ideological split, China and the newly formed Russian Federation began to develop a common policy based on a new vision that both sides accepted as the basis for future cooperation in the economic, cultural and security spheres.

For example, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, adopted in 2009, mentioned Russia’s commitment to increasing cooperation in multilateral formats such as the former G8, G20, RIC (Russia, India, and China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting) and BRICS, as well as utilizing the opportunities offered by other informal international institutions. Similarly, the 2021 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, “On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,” in the section “Strategic stability and mutually beneficial international cooperation,” specifically states that Russia is ready to develop “relationships of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction with the People’s Republic of China.”

In turn, China also demonstrated its interest in cooperation with Russia. For example, in 2016, Xi Jinping underlined that the China-Russia comprehensive strategic coordinated partnership has rapidly advanced to a high level, with fruitful results in cooperation in many fields, including mutual collaboration and support in international and regional organizations, such as the UN, SCO, BRICS, RIC and G20. In 2021, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was extended. The two sides agreed to continue close high-level exchanges, strengthen vaccine cooperation, expand bilateral trade, and deepen cooperation in low-carbon energy, the digital economy, agriculture, and other fields and promote the alignment of the Belt and Road Initiative with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China’s position on its relations with Russia remained unchanged: China neither provides direct assistance to Russia, nor calls on it to withdraw its troops from Ukraine. At the summit, Xi and Putin again assured each other of their support and commitment to joint action in the international arena. At the same time, China demonstrated distinct limits on how far it is willing to support Russia’s foreign policy. China’s Ambassador to the U.S., Qin Gang, subsequently walked back the “no limits” rhetoric, saying that the “bottom line” is the “purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter, the international law and basic norms governing international relations.”

However, despite China’s declaration of “boundless friendship” with Russia, shortly after Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow, China’s ambassador to the EU, Fu Cong, said that critics had misinterpreted China’s relationship with Russia, and suggested that their ties may not be as limitless as their leaders had once declared. He stressed that the so-called “no limit” friendship or relationship is “nothing but rhetoric.”

The declaration of a “no-limit partnership” between China and Russia, combined with China’s reluctance to support or intervene in a war waged by Russia creates an asymmetric vulnerability between the states that favors China and, in the long term, decreases Russia’s overall security. Despite their mutual interest in surpassing the U.S. as a global superpower, evidence of mistrust between China and Russia is reflected in a leaked document by the FSBʼs Department of Counterintelligence Operations (DKRO), according to which both countries have clashing interests in strategic areas of Central Asia, the Asia-Pacific, and the Arctic.