Geopolitical Speed ​​Dating: Putin was in Beijing to keep Russia alive. He is increasingly dependent on China

Xi Jinping received President Donald Trump and President V. Putin in quick succession. What was the reason for this high-level meeting between Xi and Trump, and between Xi and Putin? What impact does it have on global politics? Andrej Matišák of the Pravda Daily spoke to Jagannath Panda on this. Below is the English version of the interview, which has been translated and published in the Slovak language. You can see the Slovak version of the interview here: Geopolitický „speed dating“: Putin je v Pekingu, aby Rusko prežilo. Od Číny je čoraz viac závislý – Svet – Správy – Pravda 

1. How do you assess this political choreography by China? One week meeting Donald Trump, another week Vladimir Putin. Can this be interpreted as some kind of signal from Xi Jinping to both Trump and Putin?

Xi Jinping’s back-to-back diplomacy with Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin is less a coincidence of scheduling and more a carefully staged strategic arrangement. Beijing wants to project an image that China is now the indispensable balancing power in global politics, capable of speaking simultaneously to Washington and Moscow while remaining strategically autonomous from both. What we should not overlook is the fact that the choreography itself is the message.

For Trump, Xi’s signal is subtle. China is prepared to negotiate, compete, and coexist, but only on terms that recognize Beijing as an equal great power. By meeting Trump while also engaging Putin, Xi demonstrates that China has strategic alternatives and cannot be isolated through American pressure or coalition-building.

For Putin, the message is different. Xi reassures Moscow that despite China’s engagement with the United States, Beijing will not abandon the strategic partnership that has become central to Russia’s survival amid Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Yet there is also an implicit hierarchy in this diplomacy: China positions itself as the power with options, while Russia increasingly appears as the power dependent on those options. In many ways, Xi is signalling that China no longer wants to choose between confrontation and partnership; it wants to manage both simultaneously while placing itself at the center of the emerging global order.

2. What is the main reason for this meeting from the Russian perspective, and from the Chinese perspective?

From the Russian perspective, the meeting is fundamentally about strategic reassurance and survival. Since the Ukraine war transformed Russia’s relationship with the West into a long-term confrontation, China has become Moscow’s most critical geopolitical and economic partner. Putin needs continued Chinese purchases of energy, technological cooperation, diplomatic cover at international forums, and broader political legitimacy. More importantly, the Kremlin wants proof that Beijing will not quietly drift toward accommodation with Washington at Russia’s expense.

For China, however, the calculation is broader and more sophisticated. Beijing sees Russia as both a strategic asset and a geopolitical buffer against Western pressure. A weakened but stable Russia serves China’s interests because it distracts the United States and NATO, fragments Western strategic focus, and accelerates the emergence of a more multipolar order. At the same time, China is careful not to become trapped inside Russia’s confrontations. Beijing’s approach is transactional. Xi wants to preserve the partnership without inheriting Russia’s isolation. That is why China continues to balance its anti-Western rhetoric with economic pragmatism and selective engagement with Europe and the United States.

3. How do you view the often-repeated observation that Russia is the junior partner in its relationship with China – that Russia needs China much more than China needs Russia? Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what do you think Moscow is willing to sacrifice to keep its relationship with Beijing alive, and what could China ask of Russia in return?

The “junior partner” description is increasingly difficult to dismiss. The balance inside the Sino-Russian relationship has shifted dramatically since the Ukraine war. Russia still possesses military power, energy resources, nuclear capability, and geopolitical relevance, but economically and diplomatically, it now depends on China far more than the reverse.

China today has leverage that previous Soviet or Russian leaders would have found uncomfortable: influence over trade routes, financial access, technology supply chains, and energy pricing. Moscow understands this imbalance but accepts it because the alternatives are limited. It is important to note that what Russia is effectively sacrificing is strategic flexibility. It is becoming more cautious about challenging Chinese interests in Central Asia, the Arctic, and even parts of the Indo-Pacific. Russia also risks turning into a raw-material appendage of the Chinese economy, exporting energy and commodities while relying increasingly on Chinese finance and industrial goods.

In return, China may expect long-term energy concessions, discounted resource access, diplomatic alignment in global institutions, and political support on issues like Taiwan. Beijing may also quietly expect Russia to avoid destabilizing actions that could damage Chinese economic interests globally. Still, calling Russia merely a subordinate would oversimplify matters. Moscow retains military prestige and strategic unpredictability. The relationship is unequal, but it is not yet a relationship of obedience. We must see this partnership as an asymmetric one shaped by necessity.

4. How much attention should the West devote to keeping Russia and China as separate as possible?

The West should devote enormous attention to preventing a fully consolidated China-Russia bloc because such a partnership has the potential to reshape the global balance of power for decades. Historically, one of the greatest strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States was preventing major Eurasian powers from uniting against it simultaneously. A durable Beijing-Moscow alignment complicates that advantage considerably. However, the challenge is that the West may already be late. Western sanctions, NATO expansion debates, and intensifying U.S.-China rivalry have unintentionally accelerated strategic convergence between Russia and China. Today, both governments increasingly view the international order through a shared lens: opposition to Western dominance and skepticism toward U.S.-led alliances.

Yet this partnership still contains hidden anxieties. Russia worries privately about long-term Chinese influence in Siberia, Central Asia, and the Arctic. China, meanwhile, remains cautious about being dragged into Russia’s military adventurism or economic instability. These tensions create openings for Western diplomacy. The West should therefore avoid policies that mechanically push Moscow and Beijing closer together. Strategic differentiation matters. Europe, in particular, may eventually need a more nuanced Russia policy once the Ukraine war stabilizes, while simultaneously maintaining deterrence toward China in the Indo-Pacific. The key objective should not necessarily be to “break” the partnership immediately, but to prevent it from evolving into a formalized anti-Western strategic alliance with deep military integration.

5. In the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, what would Beijing expect from Moscow?

In the event of a Taiwan crisis, Beijing would/may not necessarily expect Russian troops or direct military intervention. What China would seek from Moscow is strategic support that complicates Western responses and stretches American capabilities across multiple theatres simultaneously. First, China would expect strong diplomatic backing at the UNSC and on other international platforms. Russia would likely endorse Beijing’s position at the UN Security Council, condemn Western sanctions, and frame the conflict as an internal Chinese matter rather than an invasion. Second, Beijing would value economic resilience support. If China faced Western sanctions during a Taiwan conflict, Russia could help through energy exports, alternative financial mechanisms, Arctic shipping access, and sanctions-evasion networks already developed after the Ukraine war. Third, and perhaps most importantly, China would expect geopolitical distraction. Moscow could increase pressure in Eastern Europe, intensify Arctic military signaling, or deepen security activity elsewhere, forcing NATO and Washington to divide attention and resources.

At the same time, Beijing would likely prefer Russia not to become overly provocative in ways that escalate uncontrollably. China’s ideal scenario would be a supportive Russia that strategically burdens the West without triggering a wider global war. In other words, the Taiwan crisis would test whether the China-Russia partnership is merely opportunistic or whether it has evolved into a genuine axis capable of coordinated geopolitical pressure against the West.