Is Australia Hedging Again? Not Really.

Jagannath Panda, Richard Ghiasy and Julie Yu-Wen Chen

Commentaries and Op-eds December, 2024

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Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, in his 2023 Lowy Lecture, emphasized that Australia’s foreign policy and national security are defined by a “complementary focus” on capabilities and relationships. Australia’s role as a middle power is bound by “shared opportunity” and “collective responsibility.” This is certainly true for the Indo-Pacific (described by Australia’s Foreign Minister Penny Wong as “the most consequential region of our time”), where intensifying geostrategic competition between China and the United States has complicated the fragile geopolitical landscape, and in turn impacted Australia’s security.

This year, the Albanese government released its inaugural “National Defence Strategy” (NDS), which reiterated the importance of deterrence, security, and stability in the Indo-Pacific region and, in turn, the defense of a rules-based global order for Australia’s national security interests.

But what does this mean for Australia’s strategic priorities and efforts to contribute to sustaining order in this region? Will Australia harden its stance on China, given the evolving nature of geopolitics and increasing ideological divisions across the world? What would be its trajectory with major Indo-Pacific stakeholders, including the other Quad partners and the European Union (EU)?

Read the full piece at The National Interest published on December 3, 2024.

This work is part of a Stiftung Mercator-funded project titled “Order in the Indo-Pacific: Gauging the Region’s Perspectives on EU Strategies and Constructive Involvement.” The views and opinions expressed are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect those of Stiftung Mercator or the authors’ respective institutes.