For Trump, India is not an indispensable player in the Indo-Pacific.

Why has the Trump administration mounted pressure on India to stop buying Russian oil while taking little action against China?

The Trump administration’s pressure on India over Russian oil imports has far less to do with energy markets than with political signaling. Washington has been frustrated that New Delhi did not acknowledge or support Trump’s role in past South Asian developments, such as the India–Pakistan ceasefire, and this sense of being “ignored” is reflected in his punitive approach. Unlike China, which Trump sees as an unavoidable systemic rival, India is not treated as indispensable in his Indo-Pacific vision. Instead, Trump appears to hold a relatively low-key attitude towards India’s strategic role and uses pressure tactics to remind New Delhi of its vulnerabilities. At the same time, discouraging Indian–Russian cooperation serves a dual purpose: it weakens one of Moscow’s most enduring defense relationships and complicates any potential convergence between India and Russia that could limit U.S. influence. In contrast, Trump’s China calculus is transactional, often dictated by tariffs and trade talks, which explains why Beijing escapes similar direct energy-related scrutiny.

Why is Trump particularly threatening the BRICS, and especially India?

Trump’s hostility towards BRICS reflects his belief that the grouping could emerge as a counterweight to U.S. economic and strategic dominance. India and China, despite their differences, both possess the demographic and economic scale to eventually alter global power balances, particularly when working in tandem with Russia. Trump fears that the BRICS platform provides an avenue for these powers to coordinate in ways that could undermine American leverage. His strategy, therefore, is to destabilize the bloc by targeting its members individually. Brazil, for example, has already faced punitive tariffs, while India is being pressed through the oil and tariff issue. The goal is not necessarily to dismantle BRICS formally but to prevent it from functioning as a cohesive unit capable of challenging U.S. influence in the Global South. For Trump, fragmenting BRICS by raising economic costs for its members is a way of neutralizing their collective rise, and India—given its democratic credentials and ties with the West—is a key target in this broader design.

Is India’s strategic autonomy sustainable in the long term? What are the options?

Strategic autonomy remains the central pillar of Indian foreign policy and is unlikely to be abandoned. However, it does not imply equidistance from all power centers; rather, India increasingly practices “alignment without alliance.” This means selectively working with the United States on Indo-Pacific maritime security, engaging with Russia on defense procurement, and keeping trade and supply chains open with China. The sustainability of this model depends on how deftly India can manage contradictions between these relationships. In the long term, the challenge will lie in reducing over-dependence on any single partner while expanding the pool of stakeholders in India’s rise. Diversification of defense suppliers, trade partners, and technology sources is already underway, with Europe, Japan, Israel, and South Korea playing bigger roles. The broader goal is to reinforce India’s multipolar aspirations by ensuring that New Delhi remains indispensable to all, but beholden to none. This balancing act—difficult though it may be—remains India’s best option in navigating an increasingly polarized global order.

How would you define Indian policies during the Cold War compared to the current government?

During the Cold War, India under Prime Minister Nehru and successive governments championed non-alignment, rejecting formal alliances like CENTO while carefully seeking economic and technological support from both East and West. The emphasis was on preserving autonomy, even if it meant slower access to Western defense or trade arrangements. Engagement with the U.S. was episodic and often strained, though breakthroughs such as President Eisenhower’s visit opened limited avenues of cooperation. Today’s Indian government, by contrast, is more nationalist in orientation and firmly grounds foreign policy decisions in perceived national interest rather than ideological commitments. Whereas previous leaderships were more open to compromise and flexible negotiations, the present government is more assertive, projecting India as a civilizational power that cannot be pressured into choices. This assertiveness is evident in its dealings with the U.S., China, and Russia alike. In short, Cold War India sought recognition as an independent actor in a bipolar world, while present-day India positions itself as a key shaper of a multipolar order.

Are Trump’s actions against India contrary to U.S. long-term interests?

Yes, Trump’s approach runs counter to America’s long-term interests in Asia. For nearly two decades, U.S. policymakers across party lines invested in building India up as a stabilizing partner and as a potential counterweight to China. This effort culminated in milestones such as the 2008 Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, growing defense sales, and institutionalized platforms like the Quad. Trump, however, operates on short-term tactical impulses rather than a strategic vision. His abrupt tariff escalations and coercive demands risk alienating India and eroding trust that had been painstakingly built. Moreover, by undermining the Quad through neglect or unilateralism, Trump weakens the very framework designed to balance China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific. In effect, his policies could push India to diversify further towards Russia, Europe, or even cautiously expand ties with China, thereby diminishing U.S. influence. Far from consolidating American leadership, Trump’s radical approach undermines the bipartisan consensus that India’s rise is central to U.S. strategy.

Could this situation change India’s pro-Western defense strategy?

India has never relied solely on the West for defense partnerships, and current U.S. pressure is unlikely to alter that fundamental approach. In fact, it only reinforces New Delhi’s instinct to diversify procurement. Russia remains a critical supplier of legacy platforms, while France has become central through the Rafale deal and naval projects. Israel and South Korea play growing roles in niche technologies and joint development programs. India’s defense ecosystem is deliberately structured to avoid over-reliance on a single supplier, thereby strengthening autonomy and ensuring resilience in crisis situations. Trump’s pressure tactics may complicate U.S. arms sales, but they will not derail India’s broad trajectory of multi-sourcing. If anything, India will intensify efforts to develop its domestic defense manufacturing base under the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” initiative. This blended strategy—mixing foreign diversification with indigenous production—is designed precisely to withstand external coercion. Thus, India’s pro-Western orientation will continue, but never at the expense of losing its independent choice.

Is India forced to look at the sea and ports to spread influence?

India’s connectivity diplomacy has both maritime and land dimensions, but given the geopolitical realities, seaborne projects are gaining prominence. Initiatives like the Chabahar port in Iran allow India to bypass Pakistan and link directly to Afghanistan and Central Asia, while strengthening its role in the wider Indian Ocean. Maritime corridors also help India counterbalance China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which has made deep inroads into South Asia through ports and infrastructure. The India–Middle East–Europe Corridor (IMEC), despite current delays, remains a vital vision to connect India to European and Middle Eastern markets. Its difficulties stem not from India’s lack of will, but from instability in the Middle East and limited policy coherence among European stakeholders. In this context, New Delhi recognizes that controlling sea lanes and access to ports is essential to its long-term influence. Still, India continues to pursue land corridors, as seen in its Central Asian outreach, showing that both maritime and continental connectivity remain complementary priorities.

Will Modi’s China visit mean a reset in relations?

It would be an exaggeration to call this a full reset, but India is clearly pursuing a pragmatic recalibration. For decades, China has been both a competitor and a partner, and New Delhi understands that Beijing’s economic weight cannot be ignored. Recent high-level meetings between Indian and Chinese leaders suggest an effort to stabilize ties after years of border tensions. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit provides India an opportunity to remain present in Eurasian dialogues while carefully managing rivalry with China. Modi’s visit reflects continuity in India’s balancing approach: keep the channels open, engage where mutual benefit is possible—such as trade, climate cooperation, or multilateral forums—while firmly resisting Chinese assertiveness on the border or in the Indo-Pacific. In this sense, it is less about “reset” and more about “management.” India is not abandoning mistrust, but is showing diplomatic maturity by combining competition with selective cooperation, thereby reinforcing its larger multipolar aspirations.

How can India reduce its economic vulnerability to China?

India’s economic dependency on China, especially in critical minerals and manufacturing inputs, is a major strategic challenge. In the short term, New Delhi cannot eliminate this vulnerability but can manage it through diversification and selective engagement. For instance, India has already begun sourcing rare earth elements and critical minerals from Australia and Canada, while also developing its own reserves. At the same time, India is ring-fencing sensitive sectors such as telecommunications, defense electronics, and digital infrastructure to reduce exposure to Chinese dominance. In the medium term, India’s strategy revolves around building domestic capacity in high-value sectors like batteries, semiconductors, and green energy. Government initiatives under “Make in India” and “Production Linked Incentive” schemes are part of this effort. However, cooperation with China in less sensitive areas, such as fertilizer or raw material imports, may continue out of necessity. This dual-track approach—combining self-reliance, diversification, and selective reciprocity—offers India the most realistic path to mitigating vulnerability while sustaining economic growth.

What geostrategic advantages does India hold over China?

India enjoys several structural advantages that enhance its geostrategic standing vis-à-vis China. First, as the world’s largest democracy, India carries greater international legitimacy and credibility, particularly with Western partners who value democratic governance and rule of law. This enables India to build trust and alliances more easily than China, which is often viewed with suspicion due to its authoritarian practices. Second, India’s geographic position at the heart of the Indian Ocean gives it a natural advantage in controlling vital sea lanes that underpin global trade. Unlike China, which must project power far from its mainland, India’s location offers direct access to key maritime chokepoints. Third, India’s demographic profile—with a younger population—gives it long-term economic dynamism, contrasting with China’s aging society. Collectively, these factors allow India to project itself not just as a regional competitor to China but also as a more credible global partner for the West and the Global South alike.

What could trigger future problems in India–China relations?

The boundary dispute remains the most entrenched and unresolved problem between India and China, and it is unlikely to find a near-term settlement. Repeated clashes and standoffs along the Line of Actual Control erode trust and create a climate of perpetual tension. Beyond the border, China’s close partnership with Pakistan adds another layer of friction, as Beijing’s economic and military support to Islamabad directly undermines India’s security interests. The Tibetan question, particularly the issue of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, is another sensitive flashpoint. Beijing views it as a sovereignty issue, while India provides refuge to the Tibetan spiritual leader, making it a source of enduring mistrust. Taken together, these issues ensure that even if trade or diplomatic engagement expands, the relationship will remain fragile, vulnerable to sudden escalations, and defined by deep strategic suspicion.

What can we expect from India regarding Myanmar?

India’s approach to Myanmar is shaped by both security and strategic imperatives. As a neighbor with a long, porous border, developments in Myanmar directly affect India’s northeastern states. Instability fuels cross-border insurgency, narcotics trade, and refugee flows, making stability in Myanmar a vital interest for New Delhi. At the same time, India recognizes Myanmar’s centrality in China’s Belt and Road plans, particularly through the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and access to the Bay of Bengal. Therefore, India supports a swift restoration of democracy in Myanmar, not only as a normative stance but also as a pragmatic way to ensure predictable governance and reduce Chinese leverage. New Delhi’s own connectivity projects, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit initiative, depend on stability in Myanmar. In the long term, India will likely continue engaging all sides—civilian groups, ethnic stakeholders, and even the military—while advocating for a political settlement that restores democracy and secures India’s regional interests.

 

This interview was published in Basque daily GARA. Edited interview can be seen via the link here, and it also can be read at the attached Spanish version.