The Slow Death of the Russian Internet: How Russia Is Reshaping Its Digital Infrastructure

Abstract

The ongoing internet restrictions in Russia have been unprecedented in scope. Never before has a country with a previously free and open internet environment attempted to build domestic barriers to block external influence by using such aggressive tactics. Through the passing of legislation, the installation of monitoring devices, and the buildup of a domestic digital services ecosystem, Russia appears to be attempting to sever itself from the global internet system, of which it has been a part since its inception. The ramifications of this effort have been reverberating across the Russian public and economy, with daily disruptions to everyday life occurring in major cities across the country. This has led to public discontent among both citizens and government officials, a phenomenon that would have been nearly unimaginable in post-2022 Russia.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia has been gradually purging its internal digital infrastructure of foreign information platforms that it has been unable to coerce or control. Although these measures became more visible after the invasion, evidence indicates that the Russian state has been laying the groundwork for a major digital crackdown for several years before the invasion.

With early indications of state censorship emerging in the mid-2010s, this gradual encroachment was hidden by vague rhetoric and the continued allowance of foreign companies to operate, albeit with increasing rules and stipulations. Domestic internet restrictions were first documented along Russia’s peripheral regions, with early experimentation with internet shutdowns occurring in the North Caucasus during periods of regional unrest. However, internet restrictions have now spread to the populated hubs in Russia’s heartland that are the economic heart of the country. Urban Russians previously relatively untouched by the effects of the war in Ukraine and state restrictions have now come under unprecedented state interference affecting their daily lives.

Compounding these problems is the Kremlin’s decision to shut down widely used media platforms, the latest of which is the hugely popular Telegram messaging app. With over 100 million Russian users, Telegram is by far the most popular messaging and social media platform in Russia. The new restrictions do not solely target Telegram but are meant to isolate Russians from utilizing any kind of outside media. Thus, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) are now being targeted in an effort to fully prevent external influences from entering the Russian media ecosystem.

The Pre-2022 Russian Internet Sphere

The Russian internet sector was created in a society that, while experiencing democratic backsliding, was relatively free. The internet, being a novel and new technology, was largely spared the regulation and state control imposed on traditional Russian media. This status quo remained until 2012. It was then that the Unified Register of Prohibited Websites was created by Roskomnadzor, the Russian communications regulator. Initially, this development was not widely viewed as cause for concern, as it mainly targeted websites with references to drugs, pornography, and suicide. However, in 2014 the so-called ‘Lugovoy Law’, a landmark anti-sanction legislation that allowed Russian companies to sue international entities in Russian courts, was passed, allowing certain websites deemed to contain ‘extremist material’ to be banned. This amendment caused controversy because the definition of extremism was left intentionally vague and was often used to suppress what authorities considered unlawful protests, many of which were associated with opposition parties and figures.

Access to the digital sphere remained relatively robust during this period, with the state unable to fully assert control over its citizens’ ability to view and contribute to digital platforms. However, Roskmonadzor continued to cement its control over the Russian digital sphere. In 2018, it successfully pressured YouTube to remove opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s ads from its platform and persuaded Google to remove his website.

In 2019, the so-called ‘Sovereign Internet Law, a set of amendments added to the 2006 Federal Law “On Information, Information Technologies and the Protection of Information,” mandated that all mobile providers install ‘black boxes’ or monitoring equipment capable of tracking internet traffic and enabling authorities to slow down or disable specific websites. The first usage of this new system occurred in 2021 against Twitter. The platform was not shut down but simply slowed, causing images and links to take several minutes to load. It was also at this time that major tech giants removed the Navalny protest-voting app from their respective app stores at the behest of Roskmonadzor.

Following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the true test of Russia’s censorship apparatus began. Within days, several Western platforms, including Instagram and Facebook, were blocked. However, YouTube remained accessible until 2024. It was never formally blocked, but during the summer of 2024 Russian authorities slowed down video buffering speeds, essentially rendering the platform unusable.