Security Expert Panda: “Democracies can negotiate ambitious agreements”; an interview with Table.Briefings

Following the EU-India summit and the FTA negotiation, Dr. Jagannath Panda, Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs, was interviewed by Angela Köckritz of the Table. Briefings. This interview was published on January 27, 2026, both in German and English. The PDF of the interview is attached here. Below is the full interview.

1. How do the Indian government and business community view the EU–India FTA?

In India, the EU-India FTA is viewed less as a routine trade agreement and more as a strategic economic reset. The government sees it as a way to anchor India more deeply into European value chains at a time of global fragmentation. For New Delhi, the agreement complements India’s broader push for manufacturing competitiveness, regulatory reform, and diversification away from excessive dependence on any single market.

The business community broadly supports the deal, but with nuanced expectations. Large exporters-especially in pharmaceuticals, IT services, engineering goods, and textiles-see the FTA as a gateway to predictable market access and regulatory clarity in Europe. At the same time, the Indian industry is acutely aware that the EU’s high standards on sustainability, labour, and data governance will raise compliance costs.

Politically, the FTA is framed as a confidence signal. Europe is betting on India’s long-term growth story, not just short-term arbitrage. This explains why leaders in New Delhi have described the deal in ambitious terms. It is not simply about tariffs; it is about institutional trust, technology access, and India’s emergence as a reliable economic partner in a divided global economy.

2. Who are the likely winners and losers in India once the deal is signed?

The principal winners will be export-oriented and globally integrated sectors. Pharmaceuticals, medical devices, IT and digital services, automotive components, renewable-energy equipment, and chemicals are well-positioned to benefit from tariff reductions and regulatory cooperation. Start-ups and SMEs integrated into European supply chains could also gain from clearer standards and dispute-settlement mechanisms. Another major winner is India’s skilled labour ecosystem. Improved mobility frameworks and recognition of qualifications would strengthen India’s service exports, an area where it already holds a comparative advantage.

Potential losers will be protected or less competitive domestic sectors, particularly parts of agriculture, dairy, and small-scale manufacturing. These sectors fear exposure to subsidised European imports and stricter quality benchmarks. However, the Indian government is likely to use transition periods and safeguard clauses to cushion adjustment costs.

Importantly, the FTA will not create absolute winners or losers overnight. Its real impact will depend on how effectively India upgrades infrastructure, skills, and compliance capacity. In that sense, the agreement acts as a disciplining mechanism—rewarding competitiveness and penalising complacency—rather than a zero-sum redistribution.

3. What are the geopolitical implications of the deal for India?

Geopolitically, the EU-India FTA strengthens India’s position as a flexible power with options, not dependencies. It signals that India’s rise is being embedded within rule-based economic partnerships rather than transactional alignments. For New Delhi, the agreement reduces vulnerability to coercive trade practices and enhances strategic autonomy. At a time when global trade is increasingly weaponised, deeper economic ties with Europe provide India with diversification, credibility, and resilience.

The FTA also elevates India’s status within European strategic thinking, from a regional actor to a systemic partner. This matters for India’s voice on issues such as supply-chain security, digital governance, climate finance, and Indo-Pacific stability. At a broader level, the deal reinforces a multipolar economic order. It demonstrates that major democracies can still negotiate ambitious agreements without ideological convergence on every issue. For India, that is geopolitically valuable: it aligns economic growth with diplomatic flexibility rather than alliance entrapment.

4. What could the FTA mean for India–China–EU triangular relations?

The EU–India FTA subtly reshapes the triangle by rebalancing Europe’s Asia strategy. It offers the EU a credible alternative partner to China in key sectors such as manufacturing, digital services, and green technologies—without forcing a binary choice. For India, the deal strengthens its leverage vis-à-vis China. While New Delhi does not seek economic decoupling from Beijing, it wants to reduce asymmetric dependence. Deeper EU ties support that objective by expanding market access and technological collaboration.

China, in turn, is likely to view the agreement pragmatically rather than confrontationally. It may increase competitive pressure on Chinese exporters in Europe, but it does not exclude China from EU markets. Instead, it introduces strategic pluralism into Europe’s Asia engagement. Overall, the FTA encourages a triangular balance rather than confrontation, where Europe diversifies, India consolidates, and China adapts. These dynamic fits India’s preference for a multipolar order rather than bloc politics.

5. Do you agree with the assessment of Modi’s “strategic silence” toward Trump’s tariffs?

I would argue, yes, broadly. India’s response to the Trump administration reflects calculated restraint rather than passivity. Faced with steep tariffs, New Delhi avoided public escalation while quietly diversifying trade options and reinforcing domestic capacity. This strategy rests on two assumptions: first, that overt concessions would invite further pressure; second, that the US political cycle is inherently volatile. By not rushing into a deal under unfavourable terms, India preserved negotiating space.

“Strategic silence” also allows India to avoid framing the dispute as ideological or personal. Instead, it treated tariffs as a transactional phase rather than a structural rupture. This kept channels open while limiting reputational costs. Importantly, India used this period to deepen ties with other partners, including Europe. In that sense, restraint was paired with strategic hedging, not inaction. Whether this approach yields long-term dividends depends on future US policy, but as a short-term response, it demonstrated discipline and confidence.

6. How does India currently perceive the EU, especially compared to the US under Trump?

India increasingly sees the EU as a predictable, institutional partner, even if negotiations are complex. Unlike the US approach under Trump, Europe is perceived as rules-driven rather than personality-driven. That does not mean India finds the EU easy to deal with. European regulatory standards, sustainability requirements, and slow decision-making can be frustrating. Yet New Delhi values the EU’s consistency and long-term outlook.

In contrast, Trump-era US policy is seen as volatile and transactional. While India still values strategic ties with Washington, it recognises that economic engagement with the EU offers greater stability and fewer political shocks. As a result, India views Europe as a balancing force, not a substitute for the US, but a stabilising pillar in a diversified foreign-economic strategy.

7. How does India assess China’s gains from Trump’s policies and current India–China ties?

India recognises that China has benefited indirectly from US–India trade tensions by consolidating its role in global supply chains. However, New Delhi does not see this as inevitable or irreversible. Relations between India and China have stabilised somewhat after high-level engagements, but they remain structurally competitive. Economic rapprochement has limits because strategic mistrust persists, especially on borders, technology, and regional influence. India’s approach and response are not confrontation but selective engagement combined with diversification. The EU–India FTA fits into this logic: reducing China’s relative advantage without provoking escalation. Thus, India assesses China’s gains soberly, acknowledging realities while working to rebalance the equation through partnerships and internal reform.

8. How might India–EU relations evolve given India’s ties with Russia?

India’s relationship with Russia will remain a managed divergence with Europe, not a deal-breaker. New Delhi views Moscow primarily through the lens of defence legacy, energy security, and strategic autonomy, not entirely in terms of ideological alignment. The EU increasingly recognises that pressuring India to choose sides would be counterproductive. Instead, future engagement will likely focus on risk management rather than alignment enforcement. As EU–India ties deepen, there may be more candid conversations, but also greater mutual understanding. The relationship will mature by accommodating differences rather than eliminating them.

9. In today’s changing world order, where does India see risks and opportunities?

India sees its main risks in geoeconomic coercion, technological exclusion, and regional instability. The weaponisation of trade and technology is a particular concern. At the same time, opportunities lie in supply-chain realignment, digital governance, green transitions, and middle-power coalitions. India believes it can shape, not just adapt to, the emerging order. The EU–India partnership directly addresses this duality: mitigating risk while expanding opportunity.

10. What do you expect from the defence and security partnership alongside the FTA?

The security partnership will focus less on alliances and more on capability building. Expect cooperation in defence manufacturing, maritime security, cyber resilience, space, and emerging technologies. For India, European defence cooperation offers diversification beyond traditional suppliers. For the EU, India is a stable partner in Indo-Pacific security. Crucially, this partnership will be functional, not ideological, focused on interoperability, resilience, and shared interests rather than bloc politics.