Climate Crisis in Tibet – Part IV: China’s Militarization of Tibet: Strategic Ambitions and Ecological Fallout

China is actively pursuing a revisionist agenda to secure dominance in the Himalayas. Extensive infrastructure projects in the region, including roads, dams, and military installations, serve the “dual purpose” of military enhancement and creating economic dependencies. Also known to the world as the “Third Pole”, Tibet seems to be facing the brunt of militarization at China’s hands with profound environmental consequences.
Beijing’s strategic emphasis on the Himalayan region demands a strong and resilient infrastructure capable of supporting sustained military operations in extremely challenging terrain. In recent years, troops mobilisation and upgradation of military infrastructure have been carried out in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). The Western Theatre Command has been quite active in enhancing its military facilities and operational strategies. Additionally, the Chinese government seems eager to push different types of infrastructural projects in Tibet, including the biggest hydro dam and even the fastest railway line in Tibet. All of these come at a grave cost, as Tibet is home to some of the rarest natural reserves. Environmental concerns are routinely sidelined, causing growing unrest among local communities.
A number of airports have been operationalized in recent years, many with dual-use potential that allows for both civilian and military functions. In 2022, it was reported that China is constructing three additional airbases in Xinjiang. This expansion of airbases allows the PLA Air Force to enhance its power projection capabilities across the region. This infrastructure supports not only the movement of troops and supplies but also the deployment of advanced aircraft, thereby ensuring that China can maintain air superiority in the region vis-à-vis India. Additionally, the presence of dual-use airports underscores the PLAAF’s ability to integrate civilian infrastructure into its military strategy, thereby extending its operational reach and flexibility. The rapid expansion of Chinese military power in TAR comes as no surprise given Beijing’s – and Xi Jinping’s – ambition to be the ultimate superpower. And there seems to be no end in sight. Under its 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), China has allocated about US$30 billion on infrastructure projects in Tibet, including new expressways, upgrading existing highways and improving rural roads, Then in January 2025, according to reports, another US$11.3 billion has been allocated for infrastructure development in Tibet.
The Chinese government appears indifferent to the worsening environmental degradation, the resultant climate change, and the irreversible loss of natural reserves in its blind pursuit of militarization in Tibet. The local people of Tibet are definitely not happy with the whole scenario. Even His Holiness the Dalai Lama has often expressed concern over the environmental risk posed by the unrestrained infrastructure development. While the Chinese leadership likes to state that its projects aim to modernize and develop Tibet, the reality on the ground is somewhat different. These projects have done little to reduce poverty at present. There have also been reports of Tibetans being press-ganged into the PLA.
China’s large-scale infrastructure build-up via unbridled expansion of military bases, roads, helipads, hydro-power projects, and dual-use village settlements in the wider Himalayan region is not only endangering the fragile ecological landscape but also creating conditions for future geopolitical instability. This webinar aims to explore the reasons behind China’s rampant militarization of Tibet, the ecological and social fallout, and the wider ramifications for the region.
The fourth in a series, this webinar will explore and attempt to address the following questions with leading experts on the subject:
- What is the extent and scope of the massive military modernization in the Tibetan Plateau? What is the ultimate cost of the upsurge in military infrastructure?
- To what extent are financial resources being allocated in Tibet to support military modernization efforts? What are the current and projected strategies of the CCP for consolidating control over Tibet through the PLA? What long-term environmental effects will it have on Tibet?
- How does the dual-use nature of China’s infrastructure in Tibet (e.g., airports, railways, dams) blur the line between civilian development and military expansion? In what ways is China’s infrastructure development in Tibet impacting the region’s fragile ecological systems, and what are the long-term environmental consequences?
- How are local Tibetan communities responding to China’s militarization and infrastructure drive, and what does this reveal about the social cost of such development?
- Can international diplomatic or environmental frameworks play a meaningful role in curbing the ecological and humanitarian fallout from China’s strategic activities in Tibet?
- More specifically, how can the EU, India, and Japan, or the Indo-Pacific partners, contribute to checking Chinese military infrastructure activities and taking action against their negative environmental impact on the region? How does the Trump administration view the developments in Tibet?
Speakers:
Dr. Shinji Yamaguchi is a Senior Research Fellow in the Regional Studies Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Ministry of Defense, Japan, located in Tokyo, and was a Visiting Scholar at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies of George Washington University. He specializes in Chinese politics, China’s security policy, and contemporary Chinese history. He earned his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from Keio University. His publications include “Strategies of China’s Maritime Actors in the South China Sea: A Coordinated Plan under the Leadership of Xi Jinping?” China Perspective, 2016 No.3, (October 2016), pp.23-31; Mou Takuto no Kyokoku ka Senryaku (Mao’s Grand Strategy to Build Strong Country) (Keio University Press, 2021, winner of the 34th Mainichi Shimbun Asia Pacific Grand Prix Award). He is a co-author of the NIDS China Security Report 2012, 2013, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2023.
Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is a Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. He was the former Dean of the School of International Studies, JNU from 2022-24. He was the Chairman of the Centre for East Asian Studies, SIS, JNU from 2008-10, 2012-14, 2016-18, 2018-20, and in 2022. He has been a Chair Professor under the Chair of Excellence of the Ministry of Defence since August 2022. He is educated in Chinese studies in India and China with a Ph.D. in Chinese Studies. He learnt the Chinese language at Beijing Language & Culture University and was a post-Doctoral Visiting Fellow at People’s University, Beijing from 1996-98. He was a Visiting Professor at National Chengchi University, Taipei in 2004, a Visiting Fellow at China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing in May 2007, an Honorary Professor at Shandong University, Jinan in 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2019; at Jilin University, Changchun in 2014 and at Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming in 2016 and 2017, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at People’s University since 2014 and a Fellow at Salzburg Global Seminar in 2010.
Dr. Zuzana Koskova is a well-known sinologist with research interests in foreign Chinese influence, human rights violations, Chinese media, and propaganda. Since 2023, she has been leading an analytical program on China at Prague Prague-based think-tank, European Values Center for Security Policy. During the Czech presidency of the Council of the EU (2022), she served at the Czech MFA, where she also completed the Diplomatic Academy program. Previously, she worked at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, in the management of science and innovation. She graduated from the MA program Modern China Studies at Freiburg University (Germany), the bachelor program Sinology and Humanities at Charles University in Prague.
Moderator:
Dr. Jagannath Panda is the Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA) at the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), Sweden. Dr. Panda is also a Professor at the Department of Regional and Global Studies at the University of Warsaw; and a Senior Fellow at The Hague Center for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands. As a senior expert on China, East Asia, and Indo-Pacific affairs, Prof. Panda has testified to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission at the US Congress on ‘China and South Asia’. He is the Series Editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia.