G7 Strategy for Countering Russian Information Operations in the Indo-Pacific Region: A Framework for Enhanced Multilateral Coordination and Response

Russian Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) operations across the Indo-Pacific have evolved into sophisticated, multi-domain campaigns that systematically exploit political tensions and technological innovations. These operations demonstrate added complexity through strategic partnerships with China and North Korea, coordination with regional proxy networks, and alignment with right-wing nationalist movements spanning from Belgium to Japan. This expanded operational architecture enables Moscow to project influence across diverse political and cultural contexts, posing significant challenges to democratic institutions and the rules-based international order that the Group of Seven (G7) seek to preserve. This strategic framework provides G7 leaders with actionable recommendations to enhance collective capabilities for identifying, countering, and bolstering resilience against Russian FIMI operations in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, it emphasizes the need for coordinated multilateral action and deeper regional partnerships, using approaches that balance security imperatives with democratic values.

Key Findings:

• Russian information operations have become more coordinated and intensified significantly, with activities in Europe nearly tripling between 2023 and 2024.[i] There has also been increased activity in the Indo-Pacific region as a result of this operational shift.
• Russian FIMI operations are not typically stand-alone attacks, rather, they are part of a global network of interconnected operations that complement one another. They comprise of numerous techniques that often work in tandem with one another and involve real-world actors.
• Current G7 mechanisms, while foundational, require substantial enhancement to address the scale and sophistication of modern threats, including deeper collaboration with G7 partners.
• Willing partners must firstly recognize a unified typology of harmful content and the main perpetrators of such content. Mapping and defining Russia’s various FIMI manifestations will contribute to preventing them in the future.
• Regional partnerships, beyond traditional allies, are essential for effective counter-disinformation efforts. This is especially relevant to the smaller community of Pacific nations who may be less equipped to deter Russia’s extensive influence enterprise.
• Technology platforms and private sector engagement remain inconsistent and require structured coordination.