ISDP-TSE 2026 Conference

Development-Security Nexus in Semiconductors

Prospects for Europe-East Asian Collaboration in an Uncertain Era

Conference Report

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Institute for Security & Development Policy
Taipei School of Economics and Political Science 台北政經學院
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About ISDP

The Institute for Security and Development Policy is a Stockholm-based independent and non-profit research and policy institute. The Institute is dedicated to expanding understanding of international affairs, particularly the interrelationship between the issue areas of conflict, security and development. The Institute's primary areas of geographic focus are Asia and Europe's neighborhood.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On October 7 2026, the Taiwan Center at the ISDP together with the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science organized a conference titled: Development-Security Nexus in Semiconductors: Prospects for Europe–East Asian Collaboration in an Uncertain Era at Sjöfartshuset in Stockholm. It was the first conference of its kind, funded by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation, a nonprofit organization located in Taiwan that provides support for research, and international cooperation and exchange.

The event consisted of three panels bringing together scholars and experts from Sweden, Czech Republic, Germany, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Each panel addressed a different important topic in the semiconductor industry, to which each expert gave their perspective.

Given the essential role semiconductors play in modern society, the growing attention to semiconductor supply chains since the COVID-19 pandemic, and projections that the semiconductor market will more than double by 2030, the conference addressed increasingly important questions surrounding the industry's future.

The three sessions highlighted the importance of semiconductor ecosystems, market demand, and innovation. While replicating Taiwan's semiconductor

ecosystem has been discussed in Europe as a pathway toward greater self-sufficiency, achieving this goal has proven challenging. Panelists emphasized the need for companies to respond to market demand and sustain continuous innovation, while acknowledging the risks faced by pioneers in the semiconductor industry. They also stressed the importance of state support in fostering innovation and strengthening the links between research, manufacturing, and practical applications.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Self-reliance has serious limits. No single country can produce semiconductors alone. National resilience requires balancing domestic capability with cross-border interdependence and selective diversification.
- Industrial policy needs long-term commitment. Sustained investment, market demand, and links between research, manufacturing and applications are essential.
- Specialize rather than replicate. Europe should not copy Taiwan's model. Instead, it should focus on areas of strength, such as power electronics, photonics, advanced materials, precision engineering and system integration, and aim for indispensability.
- The silicon shield is shifting. European de-risking may erode the silicon shield while Taiwan is likely to continue prioritizing the U.S. The EU-Taiwan relationship needs to be actively strengthened.
- Europe-East Asia cooperation is increasingly important. Amid geopolitical uncertainty, closer partnership across regions supports supply chain resilience, innovation and shared economic security.

OPENING REMARKS

The conference opened with welcome remarks from Dr. Niklas Swanström, Executive Director of ISDP. He underlined the importance of the conference as



semiconductors become increasingly critical to states and supranational organizations worldwide and stressed the need for international cooperation in the field.

Dr. Yves Tiberghien, Dean of the Taipei School of Economics and Political Science (TSE) at National Tsing Hua University, then delivered a special remark. He noted that the geopolitics and geoeconomics of semiconductors are central to research at TSE, one of Asia's largest hubs for international political economy, which allows TSE to attract researchers from across the globe. He observed that despite likely gains in semiconductor production in countries such as the U.S. and South Korea by 2030, Taiwan would still account for most of the production, including roughly 70 percent of advanced chips.

He concluded that dialogue between major powers in Asia and Europe on semiconductors, and the economic security questions they raise, is critical, and that this conference forms a critical part of that conversation.

SESSION I: PURSUING SELF-RELIANCE OR DEEPENING CROSS-BORDER INTERDEPENDENCE?

The first panel examined whether governments should prioritize building domestic semiconductor production capacity or strengthening ties with trusted international partners, weighing the advantages and drawbacks of each approach. The panel was moderated by **Dr. Yifei Zhu**, Research Fellow at ISDP, who opened the discussion by identifying one of the central tensions of the conference: balancing national economic security against the fact that the semiconductor industry remains deeply transnational. This, he explained, raised the panel's core question: how far can the pursuit of self-reliance go, and what forms of interdependence remain necessary, or even desirable?

The Limits of Economic Statecraft in the Semiconductor Industry

Dr. Ming-chin Monique Chu, Associate Professor at the University of Southampton, started the first panel by discussing the friction between the strategic control and cross-border production networks of semiconductors. She discussed the influence of economic statecraft, which she defined as a state's use of economic means to achieve national security objectives.

In the semiconductor supply chain, she explained that a country can choose to specialize, but while this can sustain innovation and affordability, it also creates vulnerability. Dr. Chu compared the economic statecraft of the U.S., China and Taiwan, where she underlined that the U.S. wants to preserve their frontier leadership, China wants to be self-sufficient, and Taiwan wants to maintain global dominance in advanced manufacturing.

She proceeded to outline the challenges and positive developments that the U.S., China and Taiwan will run into. The U.S.' economic statecraft is capable of relocating capacity and delaying rivals' progress, but it cannot recreate the semiconductor ecosystem. For China, while economic statecraft accelerates substitution, frontier



bottlenecks persist. In Taiwan, while economic statecraft retains cluster effect, reliance on external factors persists. Dr. Chu ended her presentation by concluding that economic statecraft could redirect capital, raise costs, reshape the map of production and delay access to certain equipment to some degree, but it cannot eliminate cross-border dependence.

Semiconductor Strategy of Japan: Searching for Indispensability

Dr. Kazuto Suzuki, Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo and Director at the Institute of Geoeconomics, based his presentation on the concept of geoeconomics, which is a framework that integrates geopolitical analysis with international economics.

In the case of the semiconductor strategy of Japan, he noted the extent to which the country can use the strategic indispensability of their industry and where the balance between indispensability and autonomy lies. Dr. Suzuki said that the semiconductor industry does not exist in a vacuum; it is a product of international division of labor. He specified that Japan's share of the semiconductor industry had shrunk over the years, from 50 percent in the 1980s to 10 percent today.

Japan has established some indispensability in equipment and materials but does not control any chokepoints in global supply chains, he recognized; which can be attributed to them being behind in the building of the national industry. Dr. Suzuki discussed the failure of the semiconductor policy in Japan. When the concept of the foundries was invented, it separated the supply chains, as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) focused on the production process, which is the costliest, while Japan failed to meet that change. He identified that in

Japan there were too many companies and competitors, and a lack of sustained investment. Dr. Suzuki explained that Japan is reconsidering the importance of semiconductors and thinking of revitalizing the industry but lack the knowledge. Japan's current strategy is focusing on the importance of the supply chain, specifically focusing on the automotive chips used for cars.

According to Dr. Suzuki, developing this industry was the major objective for inviting TSMC to Japan and creating their own form of strategic autonomy. He ended his presentation by highlighting that specialization is the key to indispensability, focusing especially on how to conduct the R&D and how to make an industrial cluster, which Japan is doing through their company Rapidus.

Taiwan's Semiconductor Supply Chain Under Geopolitical Risks

Dr. Shin-Hui Chen, Associate Research Fellow at Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, further elaborated on Taiwan's semiconductor supply chain and its geopolitical risks. She started by stating that more than 60 percent of the global supply chain of semiconductors comes from Taiwan.

Dr. Chen provided firm-level evidence on how geopolitical shocks are translated into capacity, procurement and partnership decisions and what this means for Europe and Sweden. Dr. Chen claims the decisions made regarding site-selection follow product type, end-market demand and strategic functions and not necessarily a geopolitical direction. She said that to reduce geopolitical risk, the first priority is diversifying production and developing products. She explained that resilience is not built through wholesale relocation, but rather it is done through selective capacity reconfiguration.

Dr. Chen compared Japan and Europe and concluded that supplier decisions depend on ecosystem compatibility rather than the relocation of anchor firms. She also noted that Europe faces an invisible ceiling in its efforts to build resilience. For example, in Taiwan, TSMC is surrounded by SMEs which support their business. Building resilience is about the cost of reproducing talent, creating an ecosystem, and having complementary assets.

She then discussed how localization takes different forms depending on what firms need to localize and how capital-intensive it is. She noted that heavy assets tend to require localized capacity whereas light assets need localized knowledge. Dr. Chen then proceeded to discuss the opportunities in Sweden, focusing on specialization and access. Sweden's strengths lie in innovation, industrial software, system integration, advanced engineering and specialized technologies. Dr. Chen suggested focusing on what the industry's strength is and not focusing on owning every capability. She concluded by saying that geopolitics is not ending the global semiconductor supply chain, but is reshaping it.

Who Depends on Whom? South Korea HBM Leadership

The panel closed with a presentation by **Dr. Sunkung Choi**, Assistant Professor at the University of Groningen, who

discussed the leadership of South Korea's High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) industry. She started by explaining that the supply chain is very complicated and reliant on multiple actors that are not necessarily European. For example, ASML sold none of its products to Europe this year. Notably, AI has also raised the value of existing capability. In South Korea, this implicates that the companies producing memory chips are rising in value, as memory chips are a major export for South Korea.

Dr. Choi explained that South Korea started investing in the chips industry in the 1970s and 1980s, leading to the development of two major firms, SK HYNIX and Samsung, excel in product execution, scalable supply and recurring customer access. Dr. Choi discussed that the HBM advantage that South Korea retains relies on three forces: global linkages, domestic rivalry and geopolitical fragmentation. She claims that Samsung and SK HYNIX have different architectures, but both operate in the global context. Samsung has relatively more internal integration, and SK HYNIX has more specialization with external partners.

Dr. Choi considered the merits of this two-rivals competition. She claimed that it can renew more than market share as there is pressure to improve; it highlights there is more than one development path, and the customer gets a choice within Korea and it is capability renewal and not merely insurance against one firm's failure.

Dr. Choi also pointed out there are limitations to the system: Micron remains an alternative, China is catching up, licensing can constrain options and partners can transmit a disruption. She explained that for the industry to be durable, the output needs to stay qualitatively high, and R&D must be done, specifically focusing on the next generation. Dr. Choi concluded that global linkages could turn South Korean specialization into customer value; domestic rivalry can renew the capabilities behind the value, and fragmentation reshapes the opportunity in which firms compete.

Open Discussion I

After these presentations, Dr. Zhu, moderating the panel, opened the floor to questions from the audience. Dr. Suzuki answered a question about the insistence on vertical integration and Japan's solution, explaining that the jumping board of the industry was making chips. Japan continued the strategy of vertical integration even though the situation changed, wanting to replicate the same success. It went right initially, but it also ended up being a factor of decline of acceleration.

Afterwards, an audience member posed a question about what the role of Europe could be in the semiconductor supply chain. All the panelists had varied answers. The positive example of Belgium and the Netherlands having several university collaborations was mentioned as a policy that could be developed even further, as it was noted that a good basis in science and technology is of importance in a successful semiconductor industry.

Another panelist argued that Europe's problem is that it has too many regulations and is not a very business-friendly environment. Continuing by explaining that Italy, France and Germany started with developing a chip industry but are not in the scene of the high-end chips

anymore. They highlighted that everybody wants to be independent and fosters the industry, but no one is willing to invest resources in academia, which lead to a lack of political will and investment in the end. Furthermore, it was recognized that Europe can contribute to the shortage of talent, as the industry is hard work and requires a great amount of educated and motivated people. It was explained that collaboration with end-demand stakeholders is essential, requiring the development of an integrated ecosystem and the alignment of the production supply chain.

SESSION II: INDUSTRIAL POLICY, DEVELOPMENT MODELS AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS

The second panel discussed different types of industrial policy regarding semiconductors, considering the successes and challenges of the contrasting policies in China, Japan and Sweden.

The moderator of the panel was **Yi-Chieh Chen**, Research Fellow and Project Manager at ISDP, who initiated the conversation by noting this discussion was an opportunity to explore what different national experiences with the semiconductor industry tell us about economic security, technological capability, and the future of semiconductor supply chains.

Growing Capacity Without Strengthening Capability? Industrial Policy and Technological Upgrading in China's Semiconductor Industry

This panel began with **Dr. Chung-min Tsai**, Professor in the Department of Political Science at National Chengchi University, posing the question: why has increasing state support been more successful at expanding capacity than at enhancing technological capability in China's semiconductor industry? Over the past decade, the two have increasingly decoupled, and the government's expectations for self-sufficiency by 2030 appear extremely optimistic and potentially unrealistic.



While Dr. Tsai recognizes that while there has been a tremendous physical manufacturing capacity expansion in China, the accumulation of frontier technological capabilities continues to face stubborn bottlenecks, as critical segments such as EDA design software, advanced lithography equipment, and raw chemical inputs remain heavily dependent on foreign intellectual property and import channels. Therefore, he argued that physical growth in capacity has not automatically translated into frontier technological autonomy for China.

He attributed this gap partly to the differing priorities of the Chinese state and corporations, as the former prioritizes self-sufficiency, the latter considers profitability. Although he explains that the Chinese state has been effective at mobilizing capital to expand physical manufacturing capacity, frontier technological upgrading depends on cumulative engineering experience, tacit knowledge, and integration into global knowledge networks, where administrative directives run into strong friction.

Dr. Tsai outlined three phases in China's semiconductor development, from early state-led investment and overcapacity before 2014 to attempts at acquiring foreign expertise in 2014–2017 and, since 2018, technological decoupling and a stronger push for self-sufficiency amid geopolitical rivalry with the U.S.

Dr. Tsai concluded that U.S. sanctions have reinforced the gap between capacity and capability, accelerating domestic production while limiting access to the global value chains needed for upgrading frontier capabilities.

Japan's Strategy for Revitalizing the Semiconductor Industry—Economic Security and Supply Chains

Dr. Jun Akabane, Professor in the Department of Economics at Chuo University, examined whether Rapidus, a Japanese semiconductor manufacturer, can become a node in the Japanese industrial ecosystem. This could be achieved through connecting the country's semiconductor strengths with new demand for cars, robots, and more.

One point he made sure to underline was that Rapidus could not survive by competing with TSMC, due to TSMC's existing major advantages in process technology, mass production scale, design support, strong customer base, advanced packaging and decades of learning. Instead, he hypothesized that Rapidus needs to play a "different game." He argued it may have a viable niche if it merges 2 nm turnaround time, Rapid and Unified Manufacturing Service, and chips with Japan's strong downstream industries in Physical AI and takes advantage of its fast and flexible development process to differentiate itself.

He continued by detailing how Physical AI is a strategic fit for Rapidus, as it can meet the needs of Physical AI primarily through greater development speed, which he explained will give the company a competitive advantage. Dr. Akabane underlined that thus far Japan's semiconductor policy had been focused principally on supply capacity, but it needed to move forward towards the next step: ecosystem formation, wherein Rapidus should act as a node between the

strong upstream assets and downstream candidates in Japan.

He noted this move to ecosystem formation should aim to discover and remove constraints that initially block a viable market for Rapidus. He proposed doing so in three ways: first, through government procurement, then joint development, and lastly, with support for the first tape out. Overall, he concluded that Rapidus should become a fast, open node connecting Japan's semiconductor strengths with Physical AI. He believes it will succeed if it achieves stable 2 nm production, wins customers voluntarily, and builds an ecosystem that sustains itself after subsidies end, though he stressed this remains a strategic hypothesis to be tested.

From Research to Industrial Scale: Sweden's Role in the Global Semiconductor Landscape

Elisabet Österlund, Secretary-General at the Swedish Electronics Trade Association, directed the discussion towards Sweden's place in the semiconductor arena. Ms. Österlund examined how a small, innovation-intensive country like Sweden can create strategic relevance in an industry defined by scale, specialization and global interdependence.

She said that the Association actively works with the Swedish government, relevant ministries, national and EU counterparts to shape the future of the Chips Act 2.0 through industrial coordination and policy dialogue. She underlined that the semiconductor market will more than double by 2030, and that today 260,000 people and 8,000 companies in Sweden depend on advanced electronics and semiconductors, with over one thousand billion SEK in turnover.

She explained that the Association also leads Semiconductor Sweden, a national initiative launched to coordinate Swedish semiconductor efforts and build a strong ecosystem. This initiative developed Sweden's National Semiconductor Strategy 2035, a plan for how Sweden can strengthen its competitiveness and position in semiconductors. She argued that the European Chips Act target of raising Europe's share of global semiconductor production from 10 percent to 20 percent was not the best decision, as other regions subsidize more and Europe lacks the demand. She stressed that Sweden needs international partnerships, more investment in infrastructure, and faster innovation.

Ms. Österlund detailed that under this 2035 strategy, Sweden should focus on chip and system architecture, power electronics, photonics, and analog, RF (radio frequency) and mixed-signal. She concluded that Sweden and Taiwan can create value by combining Swedish research, industrial applications and system knowledge with Taiwan's semiconductor processes, design ecosystems, advanced packaging and industrialization.

Open Discussion II

The moderator, Ms. Chen, opened the floor to audience questions after the presentations, which allowed for a deeper understanding of the semiconductor industry in each country discussed.

Dr. Chung-min Tsai began by noting that

no country can make a semiconductor machine on its own: an EUV lithography machine, for example, is the size of a bus and contains over a million pieces from more than 30 countries.

He added that data from China is limited for security reasons, which makes it difficult to know many details of its semiconductor industry.

Turning to Japan, Dr. Jun Akabane pointed out that Rapidus is a fully Japanese company based in Japan, unlike the foreign companies operating there. He stressed that this difference is important since it affects how the company interacts with Japan's policy and positions itself in the industry.

Finally, Ms. Österlund concluded the panel discussion by responding to a question on how all Swedish companies' interests are represented, explaining that Swedish companies are quite aligned, which makes the proposals for the Chips Act 2.0 easier to put forward.

SESSION III: INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY AND SUPPLY CHAIN RESILIENCE AMID MULTIDIMENSIONAL CHALLENGES

Dr. Niklas Swanström, Executive Director at ISDP, moderated the third panel, which concluded the conference by examining how semiconductor supply chains can remain secure and resilient amid challenges that span several dimensions. The discussion returned to the conference's focus on semiconductors as an intersection of development and security.

The Impact of Current EU ESG Regulations on Global Supply Chains

Dr. Klára Hurychová, Assistant Professor at Charles University, initiated the final panel by tracing the EU's shift from voluntary corporate social responsibility in the 1970s to binding law from 2019 onwards, driven by the European Commission's aim to make the EU the global leader on sustainability and climate. Dr. Hurychová focused on two main directives. First, the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) asks companies to report how sustainable they are. She explained that the CSRD does not require companies to be sustainable, but that this standardized disclosure helps limit greenwashing and encourages more sustainable practices, as companies wish to avoid reputational damage.

Second, the more recent Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) goes further and requires large companies to identify and prevent harm caused by their suppliers. Afterwards, she highlighted how quickly the political mood changed as Omnibus I entered into force in March 2026, taking about 80 percent of companies out of the CSRD and narrowing the CSDDD even further. Consequently, she outlined how responsibility now moves to the Member States, which must turn the directives into national law, and she noted this could lead to competition between them.

For suppliers outside the EU, including Taiwanese ones, she noted that EU customers would request data. Smaller suppliers are more protected, whereas larger companies face greater exposure as data requests can only be made as a



resort for companies with fewer than 1000 employees under the CSRD and 5000 employees under the CSDDD, respectively. While adapting to these requirements may be costly, it does not pose a strategic threat she explained.

She concluded that the Commission's guidelines will be decisive in determining the outcome. She also emphasized that cooperation with third-country suppliers is essential for compliance and that due diligence can serve as a tool for strengthening resilience.

Taiwan's Silicon Shield and European Semiconductor Supply Chain Security: A Zero-Sum Dilemma?

Dr. Markus Taube, Professor at the University of Duisburg-Essen, continued the panel by first explaining that Taiwan has established itself as the dominant and leading semiconductor producer, and as such, it is thought to be protected from military aggression from an external actor by this "silicon shield."

However, he argued that de-risking occurring today, especially from Europe, will weaken Taiwan's silicon shield. Dr. Taube outlined how Taiwan's silicon shield has been operating, with the U.S. and EU needing their relationship with Taiwan to have greater utility than costs. For China, the costs of EU and U.S. countermeasures must outweigh the benefits of exerting control over Taiwan.

He then explained the EU's new approach to semiconductor supply chain security, as it has found a need to review its strategic dependencies, reduce exposure to supply disruptions, reassess its alliances and partnerships, secure key suppliers within its borders and establish robust supply chains with reliable partners. He added that the European Chips Act and the European Chips Act 2.0 were the clearest examples of this shifting EU securitization policy turn, linking it to Taiwan's silicon shield progressive deterioration.

Dr. Taube from there posed the question: What can be done to keep Taiwan as a geographical entity relevant? He looked

into new possible methods for Taiwan to maintain this silicon shield by underlining the importance of reviving EU-Taiwan negotiations to build a more resilient supply chain agreement between the two actors.

Beyond the Silicon Shield: From Research Excellence to Strategic Industrial Capability

The last speaker of the conference, **Dr. Björn Samel**, Vice President of Emerging Hardware Technologies at RISE Research Institutes of Sweden, began by discussing how Europe has a scale comprehension gap, and not an innovation gap, which some might mistake the gap as. He noted that the goal for Europe should be to overcome its weaknesses, to be capable of building in scale and to identify research excellence in Europe as a notable area for this, in lieu of copying another country's model of involvement in the semiconductor industry.

He elaborated on this by describing how Europe underestimates the work involved in building new industries, pinpointing the need for more capital and time as well as stronger market demand than what is foreseen.

Dr. Samel underlined that Europe's competitive advantage has not mostly come from making the greatest amount of chips but rather from solving the most complex technical problems within the industry. From this, he believes Europe should build its technological indispensability. He outlined a clear path for Europe to turn ideas into real industries: first, focus on a select small number of areas where Europe can lead; then, connect research, infrastructure, funding and industry needs to support the industry from start-up to scale.

The next steps are to reduce potential risks, stimulate demand, and ultimately measure progress through new factories, scaling companies, job creation and production growth.

He closed his presentation by clearly stating that Europe should focus on the areas it is particularly strong at, such as physics, advanced materials, precision engineering and system integration. This should be done while highlighting the need to recognize that not every investment will succeed and that even potential successes will require more capital and time than expected as European capabilities must adapt to evolving governments and policies.

Chokepoints and Ladders: The Development-Security Nexus in Semiconductors

Mr. Jason Hsu, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, was unable to attend the conference in person. Included is a summary of what insights he shared in his digital presentation. First, Mr. Hsu identified a series of chokepoints within the semiconductor supply chain, or as he called it, the web, including EDA, critical minerals, and packaging among other areas. He identified countries across North America, Europe and East and Southeast Asia where these chokepoints are concentrated.

He followed by explaining the five critical dimensions to consider when analyzing risks in the semiconductor industry, which are geopolitical, physical, technological,

trust, and human capital. He emphasized that a stress on one of the dimensions propagates through to the others. The path into the semiconductor industry is more complex than it has been previously because of great capital intensity, limitations on tool accessibility, and talent concentration.

He underscored, what he names, the trusted stack, compromising areas and actors, should work together to build a stronger semiconductor industry. Mr. Hsu explained that what will allow this trust to be built by a country is sharing the provenance of components and models, having aligned controls, assured supply, open standards, and shared investment. He further explained that this trust is not automatically given but earned by a country.
He then looked to the future, outlining four pathways forward: coordinated chokepoint controls, a trusted-partner program for growing partners, a joint Taiwan-Japan-Korea AI offering, and secure chip supply for defense.

Lastly, he ended his presentation by stating that the question that should be asked is not whether there is a need to decouple or integrate but rather who gets to climb? Who gets to depend? And who gets to decide?

Open Discussion III and Concluding Remarks

Following the presentations from this panel, Dr. Swanström, moderating this panel, invited questions from the audience for the speakers to be able to gain greater insights into each speaker's presentation and the broader theme of industrial capacity and supply chain resilience in current times.
First, Dr. Hurychová underlined the difference in the effect of EU regulation on SMEs and larger companies, noting that SMEs inside and outside of Europe face significant starting costs, making their ability to operate day to day much more complicated than that of larger companies that have greater negotiating power.

Dr. Taube then answered a question from the audience, which asked if he saw a risk for Europe as Taiwan prioritizes the U.S. before it does Europe. He stated that Europe effectively exists at the mercy of the U.S., and so Taiwan will always choose the U.S. before Europe, at least for the next decade. He added that the hope would be that the EU will become stronger in years to come in the semiconductor industry to weaken its dependence on others, while recognizing this is a process that takes a long time.

Dr. Samel ended the discussion by posing a question: how long will the U.S. continue to have an interest in Europe, Taiwan, and Korea? He noted that international relationships are evolving, and it is critical to consider these when aiming to understand the global semiconductor industry.

This discussion concluded the conference, with Dr. Niklas Swanström reiterating in his closing remarks the importance of collaboration between Europe and East Asia amid rapid and ongoing changes, both expected and unforeseen.

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