Greenland: A New Frontier of Competition for the U.S., China and Russia?

Introduction

Greenland has become increasingly strategic in the evolving geopolitics of the Arctic, reflecting its importance for regional security, emerging maritime routes, and access to critical resources. Recent U.S. discussions about acquiring the territory have brought Greenland to the forefront of transatlantic security debates, raising questions about alliance cohesion and sovereignty. President Donald Trump has framed control of Greenland as critical for U.S. national security, particularly in the context of strategic competition with China and Russia in the Arctic.

Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine reshaped Arctic security dynamics and accelerated Moscow's military build-up in the region, while Finland and Sweden's NATO accession further altered the regional strategic balance. These developments have heightened focus on Greenland's role in NATO's northern defense posture, especially regarding early warning systems and maritime surveillance. Russia's deepening cooperation with China in Arctic governance—including joint exercises and coordination on Northern shipping routes—has further raised concerns about the broader strategic implications of this partnership.

Greenland's deposits of rare earth elements and other critical minerals have also attracted international interest, particularly as Western governments seek to reduce supply chain dependencies on China. Climate change is amplifying these dynamics by making previously inaccessible resources viable for extraction and opening new Arctic shipping routes.

This backgrounder provides an overview of Greenland's growing role in U.S. strategic thinking, evaluates the extent of Chinese and Russian involvement, and analyzes the implications for Arctic security and the island's future governance.

I. Background on Greenland

Geographic and Demographic Context

Located between the Arctic and North Atlantic Oceans, Greenland is the world's largest island, spanning over 2 million sq. km. Approximately **80 percent of its territory lies beneath permanent ice sheet,**[1] confining its around 56,000 inhabitant to a narrow-ice free coastal strip along the western and southeastern shores.[2] Around **88 percent of the population is Inuit,** an indigenous group descending from the Thule people.[3] This combination of vast territory and a small, coastal population results in one of the world's lowest population densities (0.14 people/sq.km).[4] However, climate change is

gradually reshaping these structural constrains by increasing seasonal accessibility and expanding areas previously inaccessible for settlement or resource exploration.

Greenland at a glance

- Largest island in the world
- Total area: above 2 million km²
- Ice-free area: 400.000 km²
- Population: approximately 56,000 inhabitants. 88% of the population is Inuit.
- Population density: 0.14 people/km²

Historical and Governance Status

Greenland's current political status reflects a **gradual transition from colony to extensive self-government within the Kingdom of Denmark**. After its incorporation into Denmark in 1953, the **1979 Home Rule Act** granted political autonomy and transferred significant domestic responsibilities to Nuuk.[5] A 2008 referendum paved the way for the **2009 Self-Government Act**, which formally recognized Greenlanders as a "people pursuant to international law with the right of self-determination".[6]The Act transferred additional competences to Nuuk including **full authority over natural resources**, and established that any decision on independence must be taken by the people of Greenland through referendum.[7] At the same time, **Denmark retains authority over foreign affairs**, defense and monetary policy, and may block international agreements deemed to have implications for the security or foreign policy interests of the Kingdom.[8] For many Greenlanders, particularly the Inuit majority, sovereignty debates are closely tied to unresolved historical grievances and questions of political agency within the Danish Realm.[9]

Although a pathway to sovereignty exists, **institutional interdependence and economic dependence** continue to constrain the pace and feasibility of full independence. An annual **block grant of approximately DKK 4.45 billion (EUR 600 million)** is transferred from Denmark to Greenland, accounting for roughly 50 percent of the island's public revenue.[10] Replacing this fiscal support would require sustained revenue generation sufficient to finance public services independently[11]—a challenge given the island's narrow economic base, with **fisheries remaining the dominant sector**. Efforts to reduce this dependence therefore center on economic diversification, including through resource development and foreign investment.[12]

Recent polling illustrates this conditionality. While a majority of Greenlanders (56 percent) support independence in principle, support declines when it is framed as entailing lower living standards. A significant share of respondents (**45 percent**) **prioritizes economic stability over sovereignty**, and many favor continued financial support from Denmark even in the event of formal independence.[13] The **March 2025 general elections** reflected this dynamic. The center-right Democrats (Demokraatit) have prioritized economic resilience and domestic social reform over rapid independence.[14] The government has stated that Greenland is **"open for business" but "not for sale"**, signaling a focus on diversification while maintaining political autonomy amid growing external interest.[15]

II. Greenland's Geostrategic Significance

Defense Posture

Greenland's location makes it a **critical node in NATO's** defense **posture** in the High North.[16] Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the **acceleration of Moscow's Arctic military activity** have further elevated the island's strategic importance. Denmark now identifies Greenland

as a core pillar of its national security strategy.[17] **Finland and Sweden's NATO accession in 2023-2024** has consolidated NATO's footprint across Northern Europe and strengthened the Alliance's ability to coordinate defense across the region. In this context, Greenland functions less as a frontline and more as an enabling **hub within a wider network of allied surveillance and deterrence capabilities.**[18]

Box 1: U.S. Security Framework in Greenland

Pituffik Space Base is located on Greenland's northwestern coast and is currently the only U.S. military installation on the island. Despite harsh Arctic conditions, the base actively supports year-round airfield operations and manages the world's northernmost deep-water port.[19]

As of 2026, Pituffik hosts around 200 U.S. personnel,[20] supporting missile warning, space surveillance operations and Arctic domain awareness. These capabilities are crucial for detecting Russian and Chinese maritime activities in the Arctic and for the U.S. ability to conduct nuclear second strikes.[21] While Pituffik serves as a permanent logistics hub for operations in the Arctic, U.S. military activity in Greenland has been limited in recent years and investments in the base have been sporadic.[22]

This ongoing military presence is governed by the 1951 U.S.-Denmark Defense of Greenland Agreement. The treaty establishes defense areas where the U.S. has jurisdiction to construct installations and deploy personnel, moving freely within these zones without infringing on Danish sovereignty. New defense areas can be established if deemed necessary by NATO, subject to consent from both Denmark and Greenland.[23]

Any attempt by the U.S. administration to amend or replace the 1951 treaty involves strict legal requirements. According to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, modifying such an agreement requires a two-thirds approval vote by the U.S. Senate, followed by presidential ratification. Consequently, sweeping changes to the Defense of Greenland Agreement cannot be enacted unilaterally through a presidential Executive Order.[24]

Greenland is uniquely positioned for **early warning and missile defense**. Radar infrastructure on the island supports **detection of Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles**, which would travel northward over the Arctic—the shortest route to targets in North America. As Russia **modernizes its nuclear arsenal** and reactivates Soviet-era Arctic bases, this early warning role has regained operational and strategic relevance.[25]

The island is also **central to maritime surveillance of the Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK) Gap**, a key chokepoint between the Arctic Ocean and the North Atlantic. Russian submarines must transit this corridor to reach the Atlantic, making it vital for monitoring the sea-based leg of Moscow's nuclear deterrent and **safeguarding transatlantic sea lines of communication (SLOCs)**.[26] NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe noted in December 2023 that Russian submarine activity had surged to unprecedented levels across Atlantic approaches and into the Norwegian Sea, reinforcing the importance of sustained monitoring in and around the GIUK Gap.[27]

Beyond missile warning and maritime surveillance, Greenland's position **supports broader air and sea denial capabilities** against Russian forces projecting power southward.[28] These functions are enabled by key infrastructure, **including Pituffik Space Base**, which hosts U.S. missile warning and space surveillance systems,[29] and **Denmark's Joint Arctic Command**, which coordinates regional defense operations and maritime domain awareness across Greenlandic waters.[30]

Maritime Access, Sea Control & Arctic Governance

Climate change is gradually expanding seasonal access across the Arctic Ocean. While commercial traffic remains limited, emerging northern routes carry strategic implications beyond shipping volumes. Control over Arctic maritime corridors has increasingly become a dimension of great power competition, affecting naval power projection and regional governance.[31] The **Northern Sea Route (NSR)** along Russia's Arctic coast could **reduce Asia-Europe shipping times by up to 40 percent** compared to the Suez Canal. **Russia claims jurisdiction over the NSR,** asserting authority to regulate transit and impose fees.[32] Moscow has demonstrated willingness to weaponize control over strategic corridors, mirroring tactics previously employed with European gas pipelines. Washington contests this position, viewing Russian control as a strategic vulnerability.[33] The **Northwest Passage (NWP)** through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago presents a parallel dispute. Canada considers it internal waters, while the U.S. and other maritime powers view it as an international strait.[34] A third route, the **Transpolar Sea Route (TSR)** crossing the central Arctic Ocean, remains largely theoretical but would offer the shortest transit times between Asia, Europe, and North America if melting ice permits regular navigation.[35] These competing claims reflect broader tensions over the legal status of Arctic waters and future governance of the region. The absence of agreed international frameworks creates strategic uncertainty as ice recedes and military activity increases.[36] While **Greenland does not directly sit on these contested corridors,** its position between the Arctic Ocean and North Atlantic places it along the maritime approaches linking polar routes to transatlantic SLOCs. As Arctic accessibility increases, the island's relevance thus lies in maritime domain awareness, surveillance of naval movements, and denial capabilities against adversary power projection.[37]



Susie Harder, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Resource Paradox

Global supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by the pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine,[38] and China's tightening controls on rare earth exports have intensified strategic attention on Greenland's mineral resources.[39] Greenland ranks among the **world's largest holders of rare earth elements (REEs),** with total reserves estimated at around 1.5 million tons, including **two of the largest known deposits at Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez.**[40] These materials are critical for defense systems,[41] energy technologies, and advanced electronics.[42] Beyond REEs, Greenland's geology possesses **important deposits** of graphite (essential for defense applications), lithium and cobalt (battery production), platinum group metals (hydrogen fuel cells), copper (electrical infrastructure) and titanium (aerospace applications). [43] At least 10 of the 12 materials NATO designates as critical for defense industries [44] and 25 out of 34 materials classified as critical by the EU are found in Greenland.[45] This resource endowment has attracted sustained foreign interest. Securing alternative supply sources has become a national security priority for several western governments seeking to reduce dependence on China, which controls approximately 70 percent of global rare earth mining and 90 percent of global processing.[46]



Yet the **gap between potential and operational output** remains substantial. Since WWII, **only nine mines have operated in Greenland.**[47] As of 2026, just two remain active: the Nalunaq gold mine, operated by Amaroq Mining, and the White Mountain anorthosite mine, operated by Lumina Sustainable Materials.[48] The **Tanbreez rare earth project** represents the most advanced development to date, with a pilot facility expected to begin operations in May 2026. At projected capacity it could produce approximately 85,000 tons of rare earth oxide annually—roughly equivalent to one-third of current U.S. rare earth consumption.[49]

With 80 percent of the island beneath permanent ice sheet and most prospective sites lacking roads, railways, ports, or reliable energy infrastructure,

the scalability of mining extraction remains constrained. Transport depends largely on maritime and air routes, substantially increasing costs and extending development timelines. Limited skilled labor and commodity price volatility further reduce competitiveness compared to projects in jurisdictions with established mining ecosystems. [50]

Environmental and regulatory factors add further complexity. Rare earth extraction **generates substantial amounts of toxic waste,** including radioactive tailings, acidic wastewater, and toxic dust.[51] Several of Greenland's largest REEs deposits are co-located with uranium, making extraction complex and politically sensitive. In 2021, Greenland introduced a **ban on uranium mining,** effectively halting development of the Kvanefjeld project. The decision demonstrated how domestic political considerations can directly affect the viability of major resource projects.[52] Earlier uranium restrictions were lifted in 2013 before being reinstated in 2021, [53] contributing to perceptions of regulatory uncertainty. **Environmental standards also remain stringent,** reflecting concerns over waste management, water use, and ecological preservation in a fragile Arctic environment.[54]

III. U.S. Ambitions in Greenland: Strategic Footprint, Political Pressure & Alliance Strains

U.S. strategic footprint in Greenland & Trump's Greenland Ambitions

Greenland has **anchored the U.S. defense posture** in the North Atlantic since WWII. Following Germany's occupation of Denmark in 1941, Washington assumed protection of the island and first established the Thule Air Base (currently Pituffik Space Base).[55] The **1951 U.S.-Denmark defense treaty** formalized this arrangement and remains in force as long as NATO exists. Should the U.S. withdraw from the alliance, it would terminate automatically within one year.

U.S. President Trump has pursued ambitions to acquire Greenland since 2019, when he publicly floated the idea of purchasing the island from Denmark—proposals firmly rejected by both Copenhagen and Nuuk.[56] In his second term, his rhetoric escalated. Trump described **U.S. ownership and control of Greenland as an "absolute necessity for national security and global freedom",** [57] and argued Denmark could not adequately defend the island against alleged imminent Russian and Chinese threats, including claims of a "flood of vessels" operating near Greenland—assertions disputed by Nordic leaders.[58]

More consequential **statements indicating that the U.S. would not rule out the use of force** to secure Greenland further escalated tensions between Washington and Copenhagen.[59] In response to this renewed U.S. pressure, Denmark adopted its **second agreement on the Arctic and North Atlantic** in October 2025, [60] including planned acquisitions totaling DKK 27.4 billion (EUR 4.26 billion) to strengthen the operational capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces and reinforce its presence in the High North.[61] Denmark also led Exercise *Arctic Light 2025*, the largest military exercise in Greenland's recent history, without U.S. military participation, an unusual development given decades of close bilateral defense cooperation.[62]

In a January 2026 interview, President Trump acknowledged that it "may be a choice" between pursuing control of Greenland and preserving NATO.[63] By casting territorial acquisition and alliance cohesion as potentially competing priorities, the remarks shifted the issue from rhetorical posturing to one of strategic alignment. Even in the absence of concrete action, invoking force against allied territory **strained transatlantic trust and complicated deterrence signaling** at a moment of heightened tensions with Russia. Beyond the political fallout, such rhetoric also runs counter to the **prohibition on the threat or use of force embedded in the UN Charter.**[64]

European allies signaled support to Denmark through a **more visible presence**. On January 15, 2026, several states including Germany, Sweden, France, Norway, the Netherlands and Finland deployed small contingents to Greenland.[65] In early February, France and Canada reinforced their engagement by opening **diplomatic consulates** in Nuuk.[66]

Domestic political dynamics in the U.S. also acted as a moderating factor. A YouGov poll found that only **8 percent** of U.S. adults support military force to take control of the island, while **73 percent** oppose it.[67] An AP-NORC survey also highlighted limited political support for the administration's approach: only **24 percent** approved overall; Republicans were almost evenly split (51% approve vs **48 percent** disapprove); and approval rates among independents (**15 percent**) and Democrats (**7 percent**) remained very low.[68] This resistance has been reinforced by pushback in Congress, including Republican lawmakers warning that coercive measures would be unnecessary and damaging to U.S. alliances,[69] and senators introducing the **bipartisan NATO Unity Protection Act**, which would bar the Department of War from using funds to "blockade, occupy, annex or otherwise assert control" over the territory of any other NATO member-state.[70]

IV. Russia & China: Strategic Interest, Limited Leverage

China

China has framed the Arctic as part of its broader geopolitical and economic ambitions. In its 2018 Arctic Policy, Beijing declared itself a "near-Arctic state" and articulated a "**Polar Silk Road**" **vision** linking Asia and Europe via northern maritime routes, alongside scientific cooperation and resource access.[71] This rhetoric sits within the larger context of intensifying great-power competition, where Arctic engagement is increasingly interpreted through U.S.-China dynamics and geopolitical rivalry.[72]

Greenland drew particular Chinese attention in the 2010s due to its potential mineral wealth. Chinese companies pursued **stakes in critical mineral projects and large infrastructure bids**: most notably Shenghe Resources' 12.5 percent equity purchase in Greenland Minerals (now Energy Transition Minerals), the licensee of the Kvanefjeld rare earth project, and a bid by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) to build and renovate three airports.[73]

Yet many of these overtures have not **materialized into lasting economic influence**. The Greenland mineral ban on uranium stalled the Kvanefjeld project, and Denmark blocked the airport bid over potential strategic risks. Shenghe has since **reduced its stake to about 6.5 percent,**[74] and there are **currently no major operational Chinese infrastructure projects in Greenland**.[75] While Greenland sought to diversify its economy, including opening a **representative office in Beijing in 2023,** tangible Chinese economic influence remains limited.[76]

More broadly, Chinese Arctic investment outside Russia has **frequently stalled or remained at the proposal stage**. In practice, China's Arctic footprint is more substantial in scientific activity, including research stations in Iceland and Svalbard, and in its expanding cooperation with Russia.[77] Since 2022, Sino-Russian coordination in the Arctic has intensified to include **cooperation on the development and oversight of traffic along the Northern Sea Route (NSR),** joint energy ventures, and increased naval and coast guard exercises in northern waters.[78] Through this partnership, Beijing gains indirect access to Arctic shipping corridors and strategic presence without the need for direct territorial footholds. Despite the rhetoric of a "no-limits partnership",[79] the relationship **remains pragmatic and interest-driven,** with Russia retaining primary regulatory control over the NSR and limiting the scope of Chinese influence.[80]

Chinese Investment, Partnerships and Proposals in Greenland (2009–2019)						
Year	**Chinese Actor**	**Project / Location**	**Sector**	**Engagement**	**Outcome**	**Status**
2009	Jiangxi Zhongrun Mining[81]	Wegener Halvø copper project	Mining	Minority participation in exploration license	Chinese partners withdrew; license expired in 2019	Expired
2015	General Nice (Hong Kong)[82]	Isua iron-ore project	Mining	Acquisition of London Mining Greenland assets	License revoked by Greenland authorities in 2021 due to lack of development	Failed
2016	General Nice[83]	Kangilinnguit naval base	Infrastructure	Acquisition attempt	Danish government blocked the sale citing security concerns	Blocked
2016	Shenghe Rare Earth[84]	Kvanefjeld rare earth project	Critical minerals	**12.5% stake** in Greenland Minerals	Project halted following Greenland's uranium mining ban	Stalled
2016	Huawei Marine[85]	Greenland Connect North submarine cable	Telecommunications	Infrastructure partnership with Tele Greenland	Equipment supplied and installed for cable system	Completed
2016	State Oceanic Administration of China[86]	Greenland–China research cooperation	Polar research	Scientific cooperation agreement	Ocean research and data cooperation MoU signed	Cooperation
2017	China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group (CNMC)[87]	Citronen Fjord zinc project	Mining	Financing and construction agreement with Ironbark Zinc	Project did not advance to development stage	Suspended
2017	Beijing Normal University researchers[88]	BeiDou satellite station proposal (Nuuk)	Space infrastructure	Proposed satellite monitoring station	Proposal declined by Greenland authorities	Rejected
2018	China Communications Construction Company (CCCC)[89]	Nuuk, Ilulissat and Qaqortoq airports	Infrastructure	Construction bid	Denmark decided to finance the airports instead	Blocked
2018	CATL[90]	Maniitsoq nickel-copper-cobalt project	Critical minerals	**25% stake** in North American Nickel	Project development has not progressed	Inactive
2019	Huawei[91]	Greenland 5G network	Telecommunications	Technology bid	Ericsson selected for national 5G rollout	Rejected

Russia

Russia is the largest Arctic state by geography, population and infrastructure**, controlling more than half the Arctic coastline** and maintaining the region's most extensive military presence north of the Arctic Circle. The Arctic occupies a central place in Russian security doctrine. The Kola Peninsula, home to the Northern Fleet, forms the core pillar of this posture, hosting a substantial share of Russia's sea-based nuclear deterrent.[92] Protecting this "bastion", where ballistic missile submarines operate, has long shaped Moscow's Arctic security strategy. Over the past decade, Russia has **reopened**[93] **and upgraded** dozens of Soviet-era installations, including airfields, radar stations and coastal defense positions stretching from the Barents Sea to the Chukchi Sea.[94] These efforts reflect a broader shift toward strategic consolidation that has intensified since 2014 and more markedly after 2022, as relations with the West deteriorated and Arctic policy became increasingly securitized.[95] *The NATO accession of* Finland and Sweden further reshaped the regional security environment, leaving Russia as the only non-NATO coastal state.[96] Despite **rhetoric linking Russia's Arctic posture to Greenland**, Moscow has no operational military footprint on the island. Its modernization efforts are generally anchored along its own Arctic coastline.[97] Greenland enters Russian strategic calculations primarily through NATO's northern consolidation and the enduring U.S. presence at Pituffik, rather than as a locus of Russian expansion.

Western sanctions also altered Russia's economic partnerships in the Arctic. With Western investment largely curtailed, Moscow deepened selective cooperation with China, particularly on energy development along the Northern Sea Route.[98] The NSR serves both economic and strategic purposes: it is regulated as a sovereign transport corridor and forms a key component of Russia's long-term Arctic industrial strategy.[99]

Box 2: Russia's Modernized Arctic Outposts

Over the past 15 years, Moscow has systematically rebuilt and fortified abandoned Soviet-era outposts to secure the Northern Sea Route, a strategy often referred to as the new "Ice Curtain".[100]

In the Barents Sea region, the "**Arctic Trefoil**" on Alexandra Land serves since 2017 as Russia's northernmost military outpost, designed to sustain 150 personnel year-round.[101] Its accompanying **Nagurskoye Air Base** was further expanded in 2021 with a bigger parking apron of 3,500 meters designed to support large-scale deployments of combat aircraft, A-50 airborne early warning aircraft, and heavy strategic bombers.[102] Further south on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, the **Rogachevo Air Base** began to be modernized in 2015[103] and currently supports MiG-31 interceptors and Su-33 fighter jets. In 2023, the Russian Defense Ministry approved a new five-year plan to expand Rogachevo's runway to permanently accommodate Tu-95 and Tu-160 heavy strategic bombers.[104] In 2024 and 2025, satellite imagery revealed the installation of anti-drone nets and upgraded air defenses at nearby facilities on the archipelago.[105]

Moving east into the Laptev Sea, the ex-Soviet outpost, "**Northern Clover**", can be found on Kotelny Island. Satellite imagery from 2024 revealed the completion of a newly paved and expanded 2,100-meter runway and apron at its adjacent **Temp Air Base**. Operating as the aviation wing of the Northern Clover complex, this upgraded facility is now enabled to receive long-range interceptors and nuclear-capable bombers. The outpost currently operates Sopka-2 radar facilities, along with anti-aircraft missiles for close-range air defense, long-range S-300 surface-to-air missiles, and heavy anti-ship missiles for coastal defense.[106] Strategically positioned to protect the Russia's Northern Fleet, these three outposts use advanced early-warning radar and

layered air defenses to detect and repel foreign military threats.[107]

Further along the Yakutia Coast, the **Tiksi Airbase** operates since 2019 as the headquarters for the Northern Fleet's 3rd Air Defense Division, securing the airspace over the central Northern Sea Route.[108] Located roughly 300 miles from Alaska, **Wrangel Island** and **Cape Schmidt** form Russia's easternmost Arctic outposts. Wrangel Island, claimed by Tsar Nicholas II in 1916 after earlier U.S.–Russian disputes, and nearby Cape Schmidt, a Cold War bomber base,[109] have both been modernized since 2014 with radar, electronic warfare, and surveillance systems.[110]

V. What Comes Next: Negotiations, NATO and Arctic Stability

Both European resolve and U.S. domestic pushback appear to have contributed to a **softening of rhetoric**, with **Trump** backtracking **on earlier threats** to use force or tariffs following talks with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte during the Davos Summit.[111] Trump stated that **a "framework deal"** has been reached and that coercive measures would not be pursued. Nevertheless, the episode has already tested the unity of the transatlantic alliance, and recent statements from the Danish side suggest that Washington remains intent on acquiring the island.[112]

While the establishment of the **U.S.-Greenland-Denmark high-level working group** in January 14 has institutionalized negotiations, early rounds of talks suggest that key issues remain contentious and outcomes uncertain.[113] Unconfirmed reports indicate that the parties may be exploring revisions to the 1951 defense agreement, last updated in 2004.[114]

The episode has also highlighted a more complex domestic layer: pro-independence voices in Greenland have criticized the extent to which discussions have been framed as a U.S.–Denmark issue, arguing that **Greenlanders have been sidelined in negotiations** over their own future.[115] This dynamic risks further complicating Denmark–Greenland relations regardless of how U.S. policy evolves.

At the alliance level, NATO has moved to reinforce coordination and visibility in the High North. On February 11, General Secretary Mark Rutte set out plans for a **new multi-domain initiative - "Arctic Sentry"** – which will integrate military exercises, enhanced surveillance, and the deployment of additional maritime and air assets in the region. "Arctic Sentry" will be led by **Joint Force Command (JFC) Norfolk**, NATO's newest Joint Force Command, whose area of responsibility has been expanded to cover the Arctic and North Atlantic since December 2025. The initiative brings together existing regional activities, including Arctic Endurance and a Danish-led exercise around Greenland, under a single framework to support a sustained NATO presence in the Arctic.[116]

The longer-term implications of these developments for Arctic security dynamics and transatlantic cohesion remain uncertain. However, discussions at the Munich Security Conference demonstrated that the Greenland episode has accelerated a broader European reassessment of security dependence to the U.S., strengthening calls for **building a stronger European pillar of NATO and enhancing industrial defense capabilities**.[117]

About ISDP

The Institute for Security and Development Policy is a Stockholm-based independent and non-profit research and policy institute. The Institute is dedicated to expanding understanding of international affairs, particularly the interrelationship between the issue areas of conflict, security and development. The Institute's primary areas of geographic focus are Asia and Europe's neighborhood.

www.isdp.eu

Endnotes

1 Flemming G. Christiansen, "Greenland mineral exploration history," *Mineral Economics*, October 2022, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13563-022-00350-2.

2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, "Greenland: The world's largest island," Denmark.dk, 2026, https://denmark.dk/people-and-culture/greenland.

3 European Parliament Research Service (EPRS), "Greenland: Caught in the Arctic Geopolitical Contest," October 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/769527/EPRS_BRI(2025)769527_EN.pdf.

4 "Greenland, the world's least densely populated area," Copernicus Data Space Ecosystem, June 13, 2024, https://dataspace.copernicus.eu/gallery/2024-6-13-greenland-worlds-least-densely-populated-area.

5 EPRS, n. 3.

6 Marc Jacobsen, "The Power of Collective Identity Narration: Greenland's Way to a More Autonomous Foreign Policy," Arctic Yearbook 2015 (2015): 102–118, https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2015/2015-scholarly-papers/127-the-power-of-collective-identity-narration-greenland-s-way-to-a-more-autonomous-foreign-policy.

7 Jørgen Nyberget, „Indigenous Self-Determination and Greenland," *Verfassungsblog*, January 22, 2026, https://verfassungsblog.de/inuit-greenland/.

8 EPRS, n. 3.

9 "The Indigenous World 2025: Kalaallit Nunaat (Greenland)," IWGIA, April 25, 2025, https://iwgia.org/en/kalaallit-nunaat-greenland/5648-iw-2025-kalaallit-nunaat-greenland.html.

10 Danmarks Nationalbank, "Reforms Can Make Greenland's Economy More Self-Sustaining," April 29, 2025, https://www.nationalbanken.dk/en/news-and-knowledge/publications-and-speeches/analysis/2025/reforms-can-make-greenlands-economy-more-self-sustaining.

11 EPRS, n. 3.

12 Flavius Cosmin Darie and Gabriela Ioana Bălăşoiu, "Arctic Role: Trade, Resources & Geopolitics: Proceedings of the International Conference on Business Excellence," *Bucharest University of Economic Studies* 19, no. 1 (2025): 1766-1776. https://doi.org/10.2478/picbe-2025-0137.

13 Verian Group, "Opinion poll in Greenland, January 2025," January 29, 2025, https://www.veriangroup.com/news-and-insights/opinion-poll-greenland-2025.

14 "Greenland election: Democrat party wins surprise victory amid spectre of Trump," *Guardian*, March 12, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/12/greenland-election-opposition-democrat-party-wins-surprise-victory-amid-spectre-of-trump.

15 "Greenland: 'Not for sale, but open for business'," The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, August 27, 2025, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/greenland-not-sale-open-business.

16 NATO, "Arctic Security," February 16, 2026, https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/deterrence-and-defence/arctic-security.

17 Danish Ministry of Defence, "The Second Agreement on the Arctic and North Atlantic strengthens the operational effectiveness of the Danish Armed Forces with new acquisitions totalling DKK 27.4 billion," October 10, 2025, https://www.fmn.dk/en/news/2025/the-second-agreement-on-the-arctic-and-north-atlantic-strengthens-the-operational-effectiveness-of-the-danish-armed-forces-with-new-acquisitions-totalling-dkk-27.4-billion.

18 Edmarverson A. Santos, "The Geopolitical Significance of Greenland," *Diplomacy and Law*, January 8, 2026, https://www.diplomacyandlaw.com/post/the-geopolitical-significance-of-greenland.

19 Coty Perry, "Pituffik Space Base -The Only U.S. Base in Greenland," Secret Atlas, https://www.secretatlas.com/handbook/greenland/pituffik-space-base/ (accessed March 12, 2026).

20 "Europeans send troops to Greenland as Trump presses claim," *Reuters*, January 15, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/european-military-heads-greenland-trumps-ambitions-island-undeterred-by-talks-2026-01-15/.

21 Congressional Research Service, “Greenland, Denmark, and U.S. Relations,” January 22, 2026, IN12643, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12643/IN12643.1.pdf.

22 “Arctic Military Activity Tracker,” CSIS, https://arcticmilitarytracker.csis.org/.

23 The Avalon Project, “Defense of Greenland: Agreement Between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark, April 27, 1951,” Yale School of Law, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/den001.asp.

24 Jim Rice, "Trump's Greenland Threats Placed US Allies and Military in an Impossible Position," *LSE United States Politics and Policy* (blog), January 23, 2026, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2026/01/23/trumps-greenland-threats-placed-us-allies-and-military-in-an-impossible-position/.

25 Michael Peck, “Greenland radars vulnerable to hypersonic missiles, critics warn,” *Arctic Today*, October 24, 2025, https://www.arctictoday.com/greenland-radars-vulnerable-to-hypersonic-missiles-critics-warn/.

26 Paulo Aguiar, “Geopolitics of the GIUK Gap: Past, Present, and Future,” *Geopolitical Monitor*, January 21, 2025, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/geopolitics-of-the-giuk-gap-past-present-and-future/.

27 Liselotte Odgaard, “Greenland Is a Homeland Security Issue for All NATO Allies,” *Hudson Institute*, February 14, 2026, https://www.hudson.org/security-alliances/greenland-homeland-security-issue-all-nato-allies-liselotte-odgaard.

28 Mikkel Runge Olesen, “The history of US presence in Greenland,” DIIS, January 7, 2026, http://diis.dk/en/research/the-history-of-us-presence-in-greenland.

29 Congressional Research Service, “Greenland, Denmark, and U.S. Relations,” January 22, 2026, IN12643, https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12643/IN12643.1.pdf.

30 Defence Command Denmark, “Joint Arctic Command,” March 4, 2021, https://www.forsvaret.dk/en/organisation/joint-arctic-command/about-us/.

31 Gabriella Gricius, “Geopolitical Implications of New Arctic Shipping Lanes,” The Arctic Institute, March 18, 2021, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/geopolitical-implications-arctic-shipping-lanes/.

32 Miaojia Liu and Jacob Kronbak, “The Potential Economic Viability of Using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as an Alternative Route between Asia and Europe,” *Journal of Transport Geography* 18, no. 3 (May 2010): 434–44, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2009.08.004.

33 Gabriel Collins, “Russia's Use of the 'Energy Weapon' in Europe,” Baker Institute for Public Policy, July 18, 2017, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/russias-use-energy-weapon-europe.

34 Justin Barnes, “Explainer: The Northwest Passage’s Shipping Potential, Legal Status, and What’s at Stake,” ed. Elizabeth Hanlon, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 28, 2025, https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/explainer-northwest-passages-shipping-potential-legal-status-and-whats-stake.

35 Mia Bennett and Bert De Jonghe. „The Opening of the Transpolar Sea Route: Logistical, Geopolitical, Environmental, and Socioeconomic Impacts,” *Marine Policy* 121, November 2020, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104178.

36 Nima Khorrami, “The Future of Arctic Governance in a Fractured Geopolitical Landscape,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, October 14, 2025, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2025/10/14/the-future-of-arctic-governance-in-a-fractured-geopolitical-landscape/.

37 EPRS, n. 3.

38 European Commission, “EU and Greenland sign strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials value chains,” November 30, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6166.

39 Lukas Fiala, “Why Greenland is the New Front in the U.S.–China Resource Rivalry,” LSE Ideas, January 16, 2026, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/greenland-critical-minerals-us-china-competition/.

40 Meredith Schwartz and Gracelin Baskaran, “Greenland, Rare Earths, and Arctic Security,” CSIS, January 8, 2026, https://www.csis.org/analysis/greenland-rare-earths-and-arctic-security.

41 NATO, “NATO releases list of 12 defence-critical raw materials,” December 11, 2024, https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2024/12/11/nato-releases-list-of-12-defence-critical-raw-materials.

42 IEA, "Mineral requirements for clean energy transitions," World Energy Outlook Special Report, March, 2022, https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/mineral-requirements-for-clean-energy-transitions.

43 GEUS, "Review of the critical raw material resource potential in Greenland," MiMa rapport 2023, No.1, 2023, https://pub.geus.dk/en/publications/review-of-the-critical-raw-material-resource-potential-in-greenla/.

44 NATO, n. 35.

45 GEUS, n. 37.

46 Ayeshea Perera, "Why the US needs China's rare earths," *BBC*, October 16, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1drqeev36qo.

47 Meredith Schwartz and Gracelin Baskaran, n. 34.

48 "The Greenland Mineral Resources Portal," GEUS, March 2, 2026, https://data.geus.dk/geusmap/?mapname=greenland_portal&lang=en#baslay=&optlay=&extent=-1178502.7926103845,5866874.3506747885,1187816.65183406,7833772.498822936&layers=g250_topographic_map_utm24n,mineral_occurrences_v3_external&filter_1=occurrence_name.part%3D%26commodity_hidden.part%3D%26genetic_model.part%3D%26regionname.part%3D%26label.config%3D%26text_search_hidden.part%3D.

49 Katya Bouckley, Annalisa Villa, and Euan Sadden, "Extreme climate limits extractive projects in Greenland to a handful," S&P Global, January 21, 2026, https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/metals/012126-extreme-climate-limits-extractive-projects-in-greenland-to-a-handful.

50 Reed Blakemore and Alexis Harmon, "Greenland's critical minerals require patient statecraft," The Atlantic Council, January 13, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/greenlands-critical-minerals-require-patient-statecraft/.

51 "Will We Run Out of Rare Earth Elements?" *Scientific American*, November 18, 2025, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/can-we-find-cleaner-ways-to-extract-rare-earth-elements/.

52 Reed Blakemore and Alexis Harmon, n. 44.

53 Mineral Resources Authority, "The ban on uranium," April 22, 2022, https://https.govmin.gl/2022/04/the-ban-on-uranium/.

54 Narmin Nahidi, "Greenland's 'green mining' row highlights the key tensions in the energy transition," The Conversation, February 2, 2026, https://theconversation.com/greenlands-green-mining-row-highlights-the-key-tensions-in-the-energy-transition-274336.

55 Mikkel Runge Olesen, "The history of US presence in Greenland," DIIS, January 7, 2026, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/the-history-of-us-presence-in-greenland.

56 Emma Anderson, "Danish PM: Trump's interest in buying Greenland is 'absurd'," Politico, August 19, 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/danish-pm-trumps-interest-in-buying-greenland-is-absurd/.

57 "Donald Trump sparks controversy with territorial claims over Greenland, Panama Canal and Canada," ANI News, December 25, 2024, https://www.aninews.in/news/world/us/donald-trump-sparks-controversy-with-territorial-claims-over-greenland-panama-canal-and-canada20241225105318/.

58 "Nordics reject Trump's claim of Chinese and Russian ships around Greenland, FT Reports," *Reuters*, January 11, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/nordics-reject-trumps-claim-chinese-russian-ships-around-greenland-ft-reports-2026-01-11/.

59 Chris Cameron, "Trump Threatens to Take Greenland 'the Hard Way'," *New York Times,* January 9, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/09/world/americas/trump-greenland-annex.html.

60 Defence Command Denmark, "Increased military presence in the Arctic," 2026, https://www.forsvaret.dk/en/roles-and-responsibilities/oget-tilstedevarelse-i-arktis/.

61 Danish Ministry of Defence, "The Second Agreement on the Arctic and North Atlantic strengthens the operational effectiveness of the Danish Armed Forces with new acquisitions totalling DKK 27.4 billion," October 10, 2025, https://www.fmn.dk/en/news/2025/the-second-agreement-on-the-arctic-and-north-atlantic-strengthens-the-operational-effectiveness-of-the-danish-armed-forces-with-new-acquisitions-totalling-dkk-27.4-billion.

62 "Denmark leads large military exercise in Greenland, without US," *Reuters*, September 18, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/denmark-leads-large-military-exercise-greenland-without-us-2025-09-17/.

63 David E. Sanger, Tyler Pager, Katie Rogers and Zolan Kanno-Youngs, "Trump Lays Out a Vision of Power Restrained Only by 'My Own Morality'," *New York Times*, January 8, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/08/us/politics/trump-interview-power-morality.html.

64 Anna Wieslander, "Trump's quest for Greenland could be NATO's darkest hour," The Atlantic Council, January 7, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/trumps-quest-for-greenland-could-be-natos-darkest-hour/.

65 Paul Kirby, "European military personnel arrive in Greenland as Trump says US needs island," *BBC*, January 15, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd0ydjvxpejo.

66 "Canada and France open Greenland consulates after Trump demands," *BBC*, February 6, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0r4lrly44xo.

67 YOUGOV, "Would you support or oppose the U.S. using military force to take control of Greenland?" January 7, 2026, https://yougov.com/en-us/daily-results/20260107-85f9f-3.

68 AP-Norc Center, "A majority disapprove of how Trump is handling Greenland," February 13, 2026, https://apnorc.org/projects/a-majority-disapprove-of-how-trump-is-handling-greenland/.

69 Olivia-Anne Cleary, "Republicans Condemn Trump's Threats to Tariff Countries Over Greenland Row: 'Bad for America'," *Time Magazine*, January 19, 2026, https://time.com/7352424/republicans-denounce-trump-greenland-tariffs-threat-america-risk/.

70 John Power, "US senators introduce bill to stop Trump seizing Greenland," *Al Jazeera*, January 14, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/14/us-senators-introduce-bill-to-stop-trump-seizing-greenland.

71 State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, "China's Arctic Policy," January 26, 2018, http://english.scio.gov.cn/2018-01/26/content_50313403.htm.

72 Lukas Fiala, n. 33.

73 Anders Edstrøm, Guðbjörg Ríkey Th. Hauksdóttir, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, June 23, 2025, https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/china-arctic-investments.

74 "Wood Mackenzie finds Greenland's rare earth sector faces multi-year development delays despite eighth-place global reserve ranking," Wood Mackenzie, January 22, 2026, https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/wood-mackenzie-finds-greenlands-rare-earth-sector-faces-multi-year-development-delays-despite-eighth-place-global-reserve-ranking/.

75 Ulrik Pram Gad, "Don't get Greenland's role in Arctic security wrong," DIIS, January 28, 2025, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/dont-get-greenlands-role-in-arctic-security-wrong.

76 Michael Wenger, "Greenland opens own representation in China," *Polar Journal*, October 25, 2023, https://polarjournal.net/greenland-opens-own-representation-in-china/.

77 Anders Edstrøm, et al., n. 67.

78 "China and Russia cooperate to expand shipping operations along the Northern Sea Route," *The Arctic Review*, July 17, 2024, https://arctic.review/papers/china-russia-boost-arctic-shipping/.

79 Oliver Dieckmann, "The Pandemic Roots of the Sino-Russian No-Limits Friendship," *Diplomat*, February 4, 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/the-pandemic-roots-of-the-sino-russian-no-limits-friendship/.

80 Roman Zhilin, "A Pragmatic Approach to Conceptual Divergences in Russia-China Relations: the Case of the Northern Sea Route," The Arctic Institute, November 4, 2025, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/pragmatic-approach-conceptual-divergences-russia-china-relations-case-northern-sea-route/.

81 Yang Jiang, *Chinese Investments in Greenland: Origins, Progress and Actors*, DIIS Report Vol. 2021 No. 05 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2021), https://research.diis.dk/en/publications/chinese-investments-in-greenland-origins-progress-and-actors/.

82 Lv Chang, "Chinese Real Estate Giant Buys Stake in Atletico Madrid," *China Daily*, January 21, 2015, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-01/13/content_19301900.htm; Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen, "Greenland Strips Chinese Mining Firm License for Iron Ore Deposit," *Reuters*, November 22, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/greenland-strips-chinese-mining-firm-licence-iron-ore-deposit-/2021-11-22/.

83 Martin Breum, "Did Denmark's Prime Minister Stop a Chinese Firm from Buying an Abandoned Military Base in Greenland?" *ArcticToday*, December 23, 2016, https://www.arctictoday.com/did-denmarks-prime-minister-stop-a-chinese-firm-from-buying-an-abandoned-military-base-in-greenland/.

84 Yang Jiang, *Chinese Investments in Greenland: Origins, Progress and Actors*, DIIS Report 2021:05 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2021), https://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/4834625/Chinese_investments_in_Greenland_DIIS_Report_2021_05.pdf.

85 Huawei Marine, "Huawei Marine to Deploy 100G Submarine Network in the Arctic Region," Huawei news release, December 20, 2016, https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2016/12/huaweimarine-100g-submarine-network-arctic.

86 "Memorandum of Understanding between the State Oceanic Administration of the People's Republic of China and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and the Church of Greenland on Scientific Cooperation," May 12, 2017, https://www.nis.gl/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MoU-IKIIN-og-State-Oceanic-Administration-China.pdf.

87 Ironbark Zinc Limited, "Citronen Zinc-Lead Project Feasibility Study Cost Update," ASX Announcement, September 12, 2017, https://announcements.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20170912/pdf/43m7s6wy83djsr.pdf.

88 Jichang Lulu, "Greenland: China Discreetly Launches Satellite Ground Station Project," *Jichang Lulu* (blog), December 14, 2017, https://jichanglulu.wordpress.com/2017/12/14/greenland-satellite/.

89 Mia Bennett, "Controversy over Greenland's Airports: A Timeline," *Cryopolitics* (blog), September 12, 2018, https://www.cryopolitics.com/2018/09/12/controversy-greenland-airports/.

90 Fasken, "CATL Acquires 25% of North American Nickel," April 20, 2018, https://www.fasken.com/en/experience/2018/04/catl-acquires-25-of-north-american-nickel.

91 Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen, "Greenland Chooses Ericsson over Huawei for 5G Rollout," *Reuters*, December 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/technology/greenland-chooses-ericsson-over-huawei-for-5g-rollout-idUSKBN1YN0X9/.

92 Ingmar Oldberg, "Russia in the Arctic: Ambitions and Constraints," *UI Brief*, no. 4 (February 2022), https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2022/ui-brief-no.-4-2022.pdf.

93 CSIS, "Arctic Military Activity Tracker," Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, 2026, https://arcticmilitarytracker.csis.org/.

94 Ernie Regehr and Kelsey Gallagher, "Military Footprints in the Arctic," The Simons Foundation Canada, March 2024, https://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca/sites/default/files/MilitaryFootprintsintheArctic_Final%2C%20March%202024_0.pdf.

95 Barbora Padrtová, "Russia's changing Arctic policy: from economic ambitions to military dominance," The Loop, April 18, 2023, https://theloop.ecpr.eu/russias-changing-arctic-policy-from-economic-ambitions-to-military-dominance/.

96 EPRS, n. 3.

97 "Nordics reject Trump's claim of Chinese, Russian ships around Greenland, FT reports," *Reuters*, January 11, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/nordics-reject-trumps-claim-chinese-russian-ships-around-greenland-ft-reports-2026-01-11/.

98 Lukas Wahden, "How to respond to China-Russia cooperation in the Arctic," *Arctic Today*, October 2, 2025, https://www.arctictoday.com/how-to-respond-to-china-russia-cooperation-in-the-arctic-commentary/.

99 Paul Weisko, "The Istanbul Bridge's Important Journey: A New Chapter for the Northern Sea Route," INSS Insight, no. 2091, January 26, 2026, https://www.inss.org.il/publication/northern-sea-route/.

100 Heather A. Conley and Caroline Rohloff, *The New Ice Curtain: Russia's Strategic Reach to the Arctic* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 27, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-ice-curtain.

101 Volterra Fietta, "The Russian Federation Creates a New Base in the Arctic," May 22, 2017, https://volterrafietta.com/the-russian-federation-creates-a-new-base-in-the-arctic/.

102 Tyler Rogoway, "Massive Expansion Underway At Russia's Northernmost Arctic Air Base," *The War Zone*, August 24, 2021, https://www.twz.com/42116/massive-expansion-underway-at-russias-highly-strategic-northernmost-arctic-air-base.

103 Atle Staalesen, "Deployment of S-400 in Arctic Bases Creates Air Defense Shield Over Northern Russia," *The Barents Observer*, December 11, 2019, https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/deployment-of-s400-in-arctic-bases-creates-air-defense-shield-over-northern-russia/157453.

104 Thomas Nilsen, "Further Expansion for Novaya Zemlya Air Base Aims to Serve Long-Range Bombers," *The Barents Observer*, April 17, 2023, https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/further-expansion-for-novaya-zemlya-air-base-aims-to-serve-longrange-bombers/165972.

105 "Russia Ramps Up Arctic Nuclear Test Site Defenses as Drone Threats Escalate," TVP World, October 7, 2025, https://tvpworld.com/89336679/russia-fortifies-arctic-nuclear-test-site-as-kyivs-drone-attacks-increase.

106 Malte Humpert, "Russia Upgrades Key Arctic Military Base With Expanded Runway," *High North News*, August 14, 2024, https://en.highnorthnews.com/politics/russia-upgrades-key-arctic-military-base-with-expanded-runway/188952.

107 Mathieu Boulègue, "Appendix," in *Russia's Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a 'Low Tension' Environment* (London: Chatham House, June 28, 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/06/russias-military-posture-arctic/appendix.

108 Atle Staalesen, "Deployment of S-400 in Arctic Bases Creates Air Defense Shield Over Northern Russia," *The Barents Observer*, December 11, 2019, https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/deployment-of-s400-in-arctic-bases-creates-air-defense-shield-over-northern-russia/157453; GlobalMilitary.net, "Tiksi Air Base: Location, Units & Runway Details," last modified July 3, 2025, https://www.globalmilitary.net/airbases/tiksi/.

109 K.M. Seethi, "Wrangel Island: Arctic Faultline of Climate Change and Geopolitics," *The Geopolitics*, September 19, 2025, https://thegeopolitics.com/wrangel-island-arctic-faultline-of-climate-change-and-geopolitics/.

110 Matthew Bodner and Alexey Eremenko, "Russia Starts Building Military Bases in the Arctic," *Moscow Times*, September 8, 2014, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/archive/russia-starts-building-military-bases-in-the-arctic; Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, *The Ice Curtain: Russia's Arctic Military Presence* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020), https://www.csis.org/analysis/ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence.

111 Alex Gangitano, "Trump rules out use of force in pursuit of Greenland," Politico, January 21, 2026, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/21/trump-greenland-rules-out-force-00738640.

112 "Trump news at a glance: Updates and latest today," *Guardian,* February 15, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/feb/15/trump-news-at-a-glance-updates-latest-today.

113 "Denmark's Frederiksen says she and Greenland's Nielsen had constructive meeting with Rubio," *Reuters*, February 13, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/denmark-greenland-leaders-meet-rubio-munich-conference-2026-02-13/.

114 "US and Denmark to reopen 1951 defence agreement on Greenland," RFI, January 22, 2026, https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20260122-us-and-denmark-to-reopen-1951-defence-agreement-on-greenland.

115 Eli Stokols and Lara Jäkel, "Trump wants Greenlanders to join the US. His comments are making that harder," Politico, January 14, 2026, https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/14/trump-greenland-residents-independence-00726696.

116 Hilde-Gunn Bye, "NATO Launches 'Arctic Sentry' to Enhance Presence in the Region," *High North News*, February 11, 2026, https://en.highnorthnews.com/politics/nato-launches-arctic-sentry-to-enhance-presence-in-the-region/1103385.

117 News Desk, "Europe Rethinks US Security Reliance Following Trump's Greenland Move," Diplomatic Insight, February 16, 2026, https://thediplomaticinsight.com/europe-rethinks-us-security-reliance-trumps-greenland-move/.