

INDIA'S POSITION IN IRAN'S 'LOOK TO THE EAST' POLICY

Javad Heiran-Nia



Although the focus of Iran's 'Look to the East' policy is on Russia and China, India also has a special place. Iran and India consider the development of Chabahar port as vital for establishing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and connecting Afghanistan to Central Asia. The INSTC can strengthen Iran's relations with India and Russia and provide these countries with geopolitical and geo-economic benefits. At the same time, it gives India the opportunity to find a suitable route to Central Asia, Eurasia and Europe, bypassing Pakistan and competing with China in creating international corridors. On its part, Iran sees India as a balancing factor against China and believes that India has a special place in the new world order. According to Iran's interpretation, the U.S. hegemonic order has collapsed and the international order is witnessing a shift from western powers to eastern ones. This issue brief, while enumerating the fields of cooperation between Iran and India and the opportunities arising from, also analyzes the related structural and regional obstacles.

Photo credit: Vitalii Vodolazskiy / Shutterstock

Introduction

The relations between Iran and India should be evaluated in the context of changes in the international order and the shift of power from the West to the East and subsequently the importance of geopolitics and transit routes in this context. Based on this, the Indo-Pacific region will play a very important role in the future of the international system and will be the arena of tensions between the United States and China. Therefore, the role of India has become prominent and

can potentially upset the balance between two great powers.¹ This opportunity has been created for India to advance its strategic goals by taking advantage of this competition. In addition, India also considers China as a strategic competitor and therefore aligns with the U.S. in its balancing strategy against China.

Tehran believes that the U.S. hegemony, which ruled the international system after World War II, has declined and the world is witnessing a shift in power from the

West to the East. Based on this, its 'Look to the East' policy is a strategic approach in the eyes of Iran.

Although India does not have the position of Russia and China in Iran's 'Look to the East', it is not outside of Tehran's calculations and in some cases, is considered as an essential complement of 'Look to the East'. Some Iranian politicians believe that relations with India have more potential for Tehran compared to relations with China.² Based on this, the government of Ebrahim Raisi proposed a long-term agreement to Delhi;³ Tehran has signed long-term agreements with China and Venezuela and is about to sign with Russia as well.⁴

Raisi's 'Look to the East' policy

The focus of the Raisi administration was on neighborhood and Asia-centered policy, which has domestic, regional and international reasons. Raisi sought to balance foreign policy by strengthening neighborly relations, expanding relations with the East, and dismantling the JCPOA from Iran's foreign policy priority.⁵ This policy has been pursued for a long time in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially during the presidency of Mahmood Ahmadinejad.⁶ After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, this policy has formed the structure of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran based on the identities of "being revolutionary", "Shiite specialism", "Third Worldism" and "Political Islam".

Therefore, 'Look to the East' has been considered as a consolidating element in the structure of the revolutionary system and has been derived from the identity of the post-revolutionary government. Based on this, 'Look to the West' is an exception and is legitimate as long as it does not disrupt the whole game of political system's foreign policy and its identity. Hence, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is determined by the establishment (deep state),⁷ and can be called a 'big game'. Based on this, the foreign policy of Iran's governments, which is followed by the presidents, can be considered a 'small game' that takes place in the 'big game,' and the "Look to the West" foreign policy can be followed by the governments to the extent that it does not disrupt the big game.⁸

“Although India does not have the position of Russia and China in Iran’s ‘Look to the East’; it is not outside of Tehran’s calculations and in some cases, is considered as an essential complement. Some Iranian politicians believe that relations with India have more potential for Tehran compared to relations with China.

The Indo-Pacific region and its countries, especially China and India, are also very important for Iran in the 'Look to the East' policy. Although India is not ideologically aligned with this policy, it is of interest to Iran in terms of geopolitics and transit. India is a member of organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (Iran has become a permanent member) and BRICS. India can also connect the SCO to the Eurasian Economic Union through the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) that passes through Iran. Both SCO and BRICS have an important place in the 'Look to the East' policy of Iran.

Furthermore, in the "future perspective of India's strategic partnership with Iran", by the Iran route and transit plans from Chabahar to Sarakhs, the INSTC and other related projects, India's access to Central Asia through Iran will be guaranteed in the shortest and most cost-effective routes.⁹

Trade Relations

Bilateral trade between Iran and India has been accompanied by various fluctuations during the last decade. In recent years, after the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, when the restrictions on bilateral exchanges were removed, the trade between two countries grew rapidly, and at times the

value of bilateral trade reached USD 15 billion.¹⁰ However, following the withdrawal of the Trump administration from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the reimposition of secondary sanctions, bilateral trade has also increased in other areas of the relationship between two countries, including the development of the Chabahar port that has been exempted from the U.S. sanctions.¹¹ However, the development of the Farzad B gas field was challenged.¹² India postponed the development of Farzad B gas field due to U.S. sanctions, and Iran decided to develop this gas field by itself. Despite this, according to Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Arindam Bagchi, Iran wanted to involve India at a later stage in the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh-discovered Farzad-B. “The involvement of the Indian consortium is underway and we are in touch with Iranian authorities,” Bagchi said.¹³

Bilateral trade reached USD 17 billion in 2018-19 and declined to USD 4.8 billion in 2019-20 and USD 2.1 billion in 2020-21.¹⁴ The U.S. sanctions compelled India to stop importing oil from Iran, and this was a big blow to the economic and political relations between the two countries.¹⁵ This was while Iran was the second largest oil supplier to India in 2008 and 2009. Also, the reduction of India’s participation in the Chabahar port project and its expulsion from the Chabahar-Zahedan

Following the withdrawal of the Trump administration from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the reimposition of secondary sanctions, bilateral trade has increased in other areas of the relationship between two countries, including the development of the Chabahar port that has been exempted from the U.S. sanctions.

railway project severely undermined bilateral relations and led to India’s criticism in Iran.¹⁶

However, the damage to bilateral trade relations was not limited to this, and following sanctions, money transfer once again became the most important challenge for Iran’s trade with India. Although in recent months and with the likelihood of the JCPOA revival, there seems to be some prospect of solving this problem. After the exchange of prisoners between Iran and the U.S. and the release of Iran’s blocked funds, there is hope that this agreement will have positive effects on the resume and revive Iran’s nuclear negotiations. In addition to Qatar’s efforts to continue mediation regarding the revival of nuclear negotiations, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, has announced and welcomed Japan’s plan for nuclear negotiations.¹⁷ Although the U.S. has stated that it is unaware of Japan’s initiative, it has not reacted negatively to it and has emphasized that diplomacy is the only solution to Iran’s nuclear issue.¹⁸

Both Iran and India have pursued various solutions over the years to eliminate the dependence of bilateral relations on international financial transfers, including the establishment of an Iranian bank in India, which is responsible for depositing import funds to India and transferring them to Iran, to define a business mechanism based on rupees, exempt from taxes.¹⁹ However, there has not been any activity in this regard. On his trip to India in June 2022, Amir-Abdollahian’s visit with the Indian private sector was an attempt to boost trade but structural economic challenges remain in the form of U.S.-led energy and banking sanctions.²⁰

Considering India’s need to import energy, Iran’s huge natural gas and oil resources are still important. Therefore, the lifting of U.S. sanctions against Iran is important for both sides.

Geopolitics and Transit

Geopolitics and transit are the main components of Iran-India relations. Iran can be the link connecting India to Central Asia, Caucasus, Eurasia and Europe. On its part, India is located in the Indo-Pacific region, which is geopolitically important for Iran.

Chabahar port connects the Indo-Pacific countries, in addition to the access to Afghanistan, to the market of Central Asian countries and finally European countries. It was in 2016 that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during his visit to Iran, signed a tripartite agreement to establish an international transport corridor (Chabahar Agreement) with Iran and Afghanistan. The main investor of this agreement is India by virtue of its investment in Chabahar port.²¹ Expecting progress in the JCPOA negotiations, Delhi had allocated INR 1 billion (about USD 12.1 million) in its 2023-2024 budget for the Iranian port.²²

Chabahar Port and INSTC give India the opportunity to find a suitable route to Central Asia, Eurasia and Europe, bypassing Pakistan and competing with China in creating international corridors, including the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The INSTC, which was designed before China's Belt and Road Initiative and is coordinated with the Ashgabat Agreement with the participation of India, Oman, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, facilitates the transportation of goods between Central Asia and the southern waters. Furthermore, this corridor will strengthen India's relations with Russia.²³

With the occurrence of some incidents in the Suez Canal and the crisis in Ukraine, the need to launch the INSTC has increased. The INSTC is so important for Delhi that Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, for the first time in the history of bilateral relations, visited Armenia in October 2021 and emphasized on taking the next steps to complete this corridor. A topic that was also emphasized by Armenia in this meeting.²⁴ Meanwhile, Armenia has announced that an alternative road to Iran will be completed within a month, connecting Iranian ports to Georgian ports through Armenia. This enables Armenia to sign the Persian Gulf and Black Sea Agreement with Iran. This brings the INSTC one step closer to reality.²⁵

The reason for this meeting should be found in the recent developments in the South Caucasus, which have converged the interests of Iran and India. The alliance

“Geopolitics is an area where India-Iran have similar concerns, from regional transit routes to energy security and freedom of navigation. In terms of regional security, Tehran and Delhi also have important common interests, especially in Afghanistan and Central Asia.”

of Pakistan, Turkey, and the Republic of Azerbaijan and the holding of the first ‘Three Brothers-2021 Exercise’, in addition to worrying Iran and India, was considered a sign of a change in the regional balance by Tehran and Delhi.²⁶ Iran, which was dissatisfied with the presence of Pakistan in this exercise, in response to this exercise, held the ‘Conquerors of Khaybar’ drills on its borders with the Republic of Azerbaijan; the drill did not go down well with Russia.²⁷ The ‘Three Brothers-2021 Exercise’ was also worrying for India, because it reflected the increasing military cooperation among Pakistan, Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan. All three of them defend Islamabad's positions regarding the Kashmir region.²⁸

Based on this, India is trying to change the balance of power in favor of itself and Armenia by expanding relations with Armenia; this is in line with Iran's interests in the South Caucasus. Because India's long-time enemy, Pakistan, has very close relations with the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey, and is the only country in the world that does not recognize Armenia because of its solidarity with Baku regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.²⁹

Furthermore, Russia has not provided significant support to Armenia against Azerbaijan, and rumors of Yerevan's withdrawal from the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has also been raised, and Moscow's cooperation with Turkey in this region has added to Iran's concerns. Iran and India also have common concern about the creation of the

so-called Zangezur Corridor. The formation of this corridor, which connects Nakhchivan to the east of the Republic of Azerbaijan, can block the border of Iran and Armenia and endanger the western wing of the INSTC, which connects India via Iran to Armenia, Russia and Europe. The Zangezur Corridor is strongly supported by Turkey, and China also supports it in the form of middle corridor (the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route). Russia's implicit opposition to this corridor has also decreased after the deals it made with Turkey, especially after the Ukraine war. Of course, according to the ceasefire resolution between Baku and Yerevan, Moscow can maintain its interests by having security control over this corridor.

The Importance of Afghanistan

As mentioned, geopolitics is an area where India-Iran have similar concerns, from regional transit routes to energy security and freedom of navigation. In terms of regional security, Tehran and Delhi also have important common interests, especially in Afghanistan and Central Asia.³⁰ Accordingly, concerns about the Taliban gaining power brought India and Iran closer together. India's foreign minister was the first foreign official to meet with Raisi after his victory in the presidential election. One of the most important topics of this meeting was the developments in Afghanistan.³¹

Iran and India consider themselves the biggest losers since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. During the 20 years of U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Tehran and Delhi have invested in economic, security and military fields in Afghanistan or in connection with Afghanistan. One of these investments was the development of Iran's Chabahar port to become India's access to Central Asia via Afghanistan and a competitor to Pakistan's Gwadar port, which China has invested in to access the Afghan and Central Asian markets.³²

While Turkey, Qatar, and Pakistan support Islamist groups in the region, including the Taliban, Delhi is concerned about Taliban support for Islamists in Kashmir, who are also supported by Pakistan.³³ Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba are among the groups supported by Pakistan.³⁴ Therefore, it is important for India to

maintain relations with Tehran so that it can counter the role of Pakistan's regional policies. In general, Iran's approach towards the Afghanistan Taliban government can help to further relations between Iran and India.

Future Obstacles

Although relations between Tehran and Delhi have broad areas of convergence in the form of Iran's 'Look to the East' policy, there are also obstacles in the way of these relations. One of the existing obstacles is the Kashmir issue. Iran, as a contender for the leadership of the Islamic world, supports Pakistan's position in this regard. In addition, for Iran, the Indian government's dealings with its Muslim minority have been a challenge. For instance, in March 2020, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's foreign minister in the government of Hassan Rouhani, wrote a tweet in response to violent acts against Muslims in India: "Iran condemns the wave of organized violence against Muslims in India and we ask the Indian authorities to ensure the welfare of all Indians and do not allow this senseless killing to continue".³⁵ Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the leader of Iran, in 2019, pointing out that Iran has good relations with India, said about the Kashmir crisis: "The expectation from the Indian government is to adopt a fair policy towards the noble people of Kashmir. And the Muslim people of this region should not be forced." He has expressed sadness about the situation of Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir.³⁶

Another obstacle to expansion of relations between two states is the U.S. sanctions. After Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA, India complied with the U.S. sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, India's relations with Israel are considered to be a major obstacle in improving bilateral ties between Tehran and Delhi. Despite the fact that India is trying to balance relations with Iran and Israel, Israel's actions have even led to occasional tensions between the leaders of Iran and India. These things are rarely made public, but they exist behind the scenes. Such tensions arose after Modi's unprecedented visit to Tel Aviv in 2017,³⁷ which was the first such visit by an Indian Prime Minister. Perhaps partially in response, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the leader of Iran, raised the issue of Kashmir twice in two weeks;³⁸ a subject that he had rarely mentioned before.

Delhi's relations with Tel Aviv in the form of the I2U2 alliance, which consists of India, Israel, the United States and the United Arab Emirates, may add more to this concern. Focusing on maritime security, infrastructure, transport and trade, the I2U2 alliance is similar to the Quad, while advancing the vision of the Abraham Accords with economic development. Advancing Delhi's Middle East policy, I2U2 could be an alternative to its geo-economic initiatives with Iran.³⁹ Another infrastructure project that has attracted India and Israel is the 'India-Arabian-Mediterranean Corridor' to Europe, which will connect ports in India, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Greece.⁴⁰

Moreover, the increasing relations between Iran and China has cast a shadow on the relations between Tehran and Delhi. China also has a special position in the 'Look to the East' policy of Iran. The two countries have signed a 25-year strategic cooperation document with each other, and Beijing has recently acted as a mediator and guarantor in improving relations between Tehran and Riyadh and has pulled Iran out of regional isolation. Accordingly, Iran's dependence on China is more than that on India. Even in the key Chabahar project, China has been able to overshadow Iran's cooperation with India through pressure. India is now concerned about increasing Chinese investment in the Chabahar and Jask ports. Former Indian ambassador to Iran K.C. Singh writing in *The Hindu*, said that India should carefully monitor all developments related to China's investment in Chabahar and Jask ports. "[The Iran-China agreement] overshadows India's 'strategic relations' with Iran and the use of the Chabahar port. Jask is located in the west of Chabahar and is ahead of the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, China may expand its control along the coasts of Iran and Pakistan."⁴¹

Tehran should try to redefine the tripartite agreement between Afghanistan, India, and Iran, and rediscuss Chabahar. This issue was raised during Amir-Abdollahian's visit to India in June 2022.⁴² Despite the fact that the importance of Chabahar port in terms of connecting India to Europe has decreased for Delhi due to the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic

Corridor,⁴³ Chabahar port is the route connecting India to Central Asia and Russia via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

Conclusion

Despite some complications in Tehran-Delhi relations, including India's relations with the U.S. and Israel on the one hand and Iran-China relations on the other, both sides have mutual needs and interests in alignment with each other. India complements Iran's equations in the 'Look to the East' policy. The importance of the north-south corridor as a connecting route via Iran to Central Asia, Eurasia and the Caucasus is of vital importance for Delhi. The 'Look to the East' policy allows Tehran to balance relations with India and China. India also does not want to lose an important strategic partner in the Persian Gulf, especially as Delhi can restrain Islamabad in some cases through Iran's regional role. The revival of the JCPOA is likely to have a major impact on Indo-Iranian relations, especially if U.S. sanctions are lifted.

Author –

Dr Javad Heiran-Nia is Director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran. He is currently working on a book about Iran's middle class. Follow him on X: @J_Heirannia.

© The Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2024.
This Issue Brief can be freely reproduced provided that ISDP is informed.

ABOUT ISDP

The Institute for Security and Development Policy is a Stockholm-based independent and non-profit research and policy institute. The Institute is dedicated to expanding understanding of international affairs, particularly the interrelationship between the issue areas of conflict, security and development. The Institute's primary areas of geographic focus are Asia and Europe's neighborhood.

www.isdp.eu

Endnotes

- 1 Mohammed Soliman, "A New Asian Order Is Emerging," Project Syndicate, April 4, 2023, <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/abe-shinzo-vision-of-broader-asia-has-begun-to-shape-by-mohammed-soliman-2023-04?barrier=accesspaylog>.
- 2 "Iran's relationship with India has 'far more potential' than China: Ex-president Ahmadinejad," *The New Indian Express*, August 3, 2021, <https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2021/Aug/03/irans-relationship-with-india-has-far-more-potential-than-china-ex-president-ahmadinejad-2339698.html>.
- 3 "Amir-Abdollahian: We are looking for a roadmap for long-term cooperation with India," *Fars News Agency*, June 8, 2022, <http://fna.ir/1pfi9x>.
- 4 "Russia's readiness to finalize the comprehensive long-term cooperation document with Iran," *Fars News Agency*, June 3, 2023, <http://fna.ir/3cxs42>.
- 5 "Raisi: Close cooperation between Iran and Nicaragua necessary to neutralize US sanctions/ Ortega: Maintaining unity and growing solidarity between two nations is crucial," *Young Journalists Club*, August 31, 2021, <https://www.yjc.news/fa/news/7876219>.
- 6 "Six reasons to prefer East to West," *Khamenei.ir*, February 19, 2018, <https://khl.ink/f/38981>.
- 7 The Iranian deep state is composed of an intricate security, intelligence, and economic superstructure whose goal is to preserve the fundamental revolutionary nature, vision, and security of the Islamic Republic. See Sanam Wakil and Hossein Rassam, "The Iranian Deep State: Understanding the Politics of Transition in the Islamic Republic," The Hoover Institution, October 12, 2020, <https://www.hoover.org/research/iranian-deep-state>.
- 8 Mohammad Reza Tajik, "Government without government," *Shargh Newspaper*, July 18, 2021, <https://www.pishkhan.com/news/232986>.
- 9 Hossein Pourahmadi Meibodi, Abdul Ali Qavam and Mahmood Khani Joyabad, "The political economy of India's foreign policy and its linking and communication strategies with Central Asia," *Central Asia and Caucasus Quarterly*, http://ca.ipisjournals.ir/article_28044_9c3776c2a4501bc76b13e26bb5063483.pdf.
- 10 "Review of Indian Trade Policy," *Economic Research Center of Iran Chamber*, June 13, 2022, <https://research.chambertrust.ir>.
- 11 Zein Basravi, "Iran's Chabahar port spared from US sanctions in rare cooperation," *Al Jazeera*, June 20, 2020, <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/6/20/irans-chabahar-port-spared-from-us-sanctions-in-rare-cooperation>.
- 12 "Review of Indian Trade Policy," n. 10.
- 13 "Iran wanted to involve India at later stage in development of Farzad-B gas field: MEA," *Times of India*, May 20, 2021, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/iran-wanted-to-involve-india-at-later-stage-in-development-of-farzad-b-gas-field-mea/articleshow/82806998.cms>.
- 14 Hamed Kermani, "Iran struggles to fulfill potential of relations with India," *Amwaj Media*, August 2, 2022, <https://amwaj.media/article/iran-struggles-to-fulfill-potential-of-india-relations>.
- 15 Pourahmadi Meibodi, "The political economy of India's foreign policy and its linking and communication strategies with Central Asia," *Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal* 23, no. 98 (August 2017): 1-32.
- 16 Farzad Ramezani Bonesh, "The future of India-Iran relations," *Amwaj Media*, October 29, 2021, <https://amwaj.media/article/challenges-opportunities-and-prospects-of-iran-india-relations>.
- 17 "Amir-Abdollahian: Japan has proposed a plan to resume nuclear negotiations with Iran," *Fars News Agency*, September 26, 2023, <http://fna.ir/3f9l52>.
- 18 "America's reaction to Amir-Abdollahian 's statements about Japan's initiative," *Fars News Agency*, September 27, 2023, <http://fna.ir/3f9sz1>.
- 19 "The first step to establish an independent financial channel between Iran and India," *Hamshahri Online*, November 15, 2018, <https://newspaper.hamshahrionline.ir/id/37616>.
- 20 Hamed Kermani, n. 14.
- 21 "Iran and India in 2016, Modi's visit to Iran," *IRNA News Agency*, December 21, 2016, <https://irna.ir/xjj2nk>.
- 22 Sabena Siddiqui, "Iran-India ties strained by geopolitics, buoyed by economics," *Al-Monitor*, March 10, 2023, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/02/iran-india-ties-strained-geopolitics-buoyed-economics#ixzz7xLN0HmXi>.
- 23 Tahmineh Ghamkhar, "The future of the north-south corridor; India's approach towards Iran and Russia," *Tahlil Bazaar News Agency*, January 25, 2023, tahlilbazaar.com/x3KcS.

- 24 “Meeting of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan with Minister of Foreign Affairs of India Subrahmanyam Jaishankar,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, October 13, 2021, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-releases/2021/10/13/fm_armenia_india_meeting/11127.
- 25 Lilit Hayrapetyanm, “India’s Turn Toward Armenia,” *The Diplomat*, October 20, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/indias-turn-toward-armenia/>.
- 26 Özge Eletek, “Show of Strength from Turkey-Azerbaijan-Pakistan: Three Brothers-2021 Exercise,” *Ankasam*, September 29, 2021, <https://www.ankasam.org/show-of-strength-from-turkey-azerbaijan-pakistan-three-brothers-2021-exercisev/?lang=en>.
- 27 “The ‘Conquerors of Khaybar’ drills army ground forces started in the north-west region,” *IRNA News Agency*, October 1, 2021, <https://irna.ir/xjG9mK>.
- 28 Omar Ahmed, “Is the South Caucasus a new battleground for India and Pakistan?” *Middle East Monitor*, October 3, 2022, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20221003-is-the-south-caucasus-a-new-battleground-for-india-and-pakistan/>.
- 29 “Pakistan, the country which does not recognize Armenia – More Turkey than Turkey!” *Greek City Times*, September 21, 2022, <https://greekcitytimes.com/2022/09/21/country-not-recognise-armenia/>.
- 30 Hamed Kermani, n. 14.
- 31 “The Indian Foreign Minister met with the President-elect,” *IRNA News Agency*, July 7, 2021, <https://www.irna.ir/news/84396701>.
- 32 Ahmad Movafagh Zeidan, “Pakistan, Iran and India view Afghanistan,” *Arabi 21*, September 27, 2021, <https://arabi21.com/story/1387526>.
- 33 C. Raja Mohan, “Ebrahim Raisi and India’s Bet on Iran,” *Foreign Policy*, August 4, 2021, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/04/india-iran-raisi-modi-jaishankar-us-withdrawal-afghanistan/>.
- 34 Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, April/May 2009, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2009/04/Tankel_01.pdf.
- 35 “Zarif condemned the wave of organized violence against Muslims in India,” *Fars News Agency*, March 2, 2020, <https://www.farsnews.ir/news/13981212001268>.
- 36 “The Indian government should adopt a fair policy towards the people of Kashmir,” August 21, 2019, <https://modir.velayat.ir/fa/media/play/27325?year=1398&type=0&page=40>.
- 37 “India’s Narendra Modi Visits Israel, Sees Israeli Desalination Tech at Beach With Netanyahu,” *Haaretz*, Jul 6, 2017, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2017-07-06/ty-article/indias-narendra-modi-visits-israel-sees-israeli-desalination-tech-at-beach-with-netanyahu/0000017f-e634-da9b-a1ff-ee7f10560000>.
- 38 “Ali Khamenei and “Green Kashmir”: Indian media’s reaction to the positions of the leader of the Islamic Republic,” *Kayhan London*, June 28, 2017, <https://kayhan.london/1396/04/07/80140/>.
- 39 Mohammed Soliman, “An Indo-Abrahamic alliance on the rise: How India, Israel, and the UAE are creating a new transregional order,” Middle East Institute, July 28, 2021, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/indo-abrahamic-alliance-rise-how-india-israel-and-uae-are-creating-new-transregional>.
- 40 Gedaliah Afterman, and Narayanappa Janardhan, “India and Israel can be pivots in deglobalizing Asia,” Observer Research Foundation, March 28, 2023, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-and-israel-can-be-pivots-in-reglobalising-asia/>.
- 41 Suhasini Haidar, “Iran drops India from Chabahar rail project, cites funding delay,” *The Hindu*, July 14, 2020, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/iran-drops-india-from-chabahar-rail-project-cites-funding-delay/article32072428.ece>.
- 42 Hamed Kermani, n. 14.
- 43 “G20: EU and US back trade corridor linking Europe, Middle East and India,” *The Guardian*, September 9, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/09/g20-eu-and-us-back-trade-corridor-linking-europe-middle-east-and-india>.