

INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT POLICY

ANNUAL REPORT
2022



Institute for Security &
Development Policy



DEAR FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES,

We look back at 2022, a year in which tensions in ISDP's focus areas increased, the war in Ukraine changed the face of Eurasia and created insecurity about potential spillover effects to Asian security, and the pandemic still posed a major challenge in some areas.

This year has seen instability and conflict in many areas of ISDP's expertise. Pressure from mainland China on Taiwan has reached alarming levels in recent months, especially since the private visit to Taiwan of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. North Korea intensified its provocative ballistic missile tests off the coast of South Korea and Japan. Sino-U.S. tensions have been grow-

ing, and Europe expressed a more critical policy on China in the Strategic Compass. Moreover, the Twentieth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took place in October and Xi Jinping began a historic third term in office.

Central Asia saw a serious uptick in violence as unrest affected four of the region's five countries, rocking even the previously stable Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The Caucasus saw continued unrest between Armenia and Azerbaijan, compounded by Georgia's internal unrest. In parallel, the geopolitical struggle surrounding the region heated up, as inklings of Turkish-Iranian rivalry in both Central Asia and the

Caucasus compounded the existing competition for influence among Russia, China, and the Western powers.

The need for solid analysis, in-depth discussion, and dialogue is evident in these areas. ISDP has continued to bridge the gap between academia and policymakers by providing up-to-date analysis and forums for discussion and debate. We look forward to continuing to deepen our collaboration with sponsors and partners, receiving feedback, and meeting you at our events – in person or digitally – in 2023.

Sincerely,

Niklas Swanström &
Svante E. Cornell



ABOUT ISDP

ISDP is a Stockholm-based non-profit and non-partisan research and policy organization operating through two permanent programs: The Asia Program and the Silk Road Studies Program.

Within these two principal programs, work at ISDP is organized in Centers and Projects. Centers have a long-term scope and focus on larger thematic areas whereas Projects are established to deliver specific outputs with a deeper and more narrowed focus, within a short-term framework.

The Asia Program conducts research into security and development challenges in the Asian region with a focus on the sub-regions of Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia. As such, it carries out policy-oriented and practical research, facilitates confidence-building exercises, and organizes conferences and seminars. The main objectives are not only to be a bridge between academia and policy but to provide strategic insights and policy recommendations to decision-makers in governments, international institutions, and the private sector.

The Silk Road Studies Program runs a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center with the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington D.C. The Program focuses on the western part of Eurasia, particularly Central Asia, the Caucasus, Turkey, and Eastern Europe. The main activities and research are focused on state-building and political development, security and conflict, as well as the relationships between the regions and the West.

UNDERSTANDING AND ENGAGING

For over a decade, ISDP has worked to expand the understanding of international affairs in its focus areas. Concentrating on the inter-relationship between security, conflict, and development, ISDP showcases its research through analyses as well as practical activities aimed at promoting dialogue.

Since 2007, the Institute has provided independent analyses to policymakers and other relevant institutions. ISDP functions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion of its focus areas through applied research, publications, research co-

operation, public lectures, seminars and webinars.


ISDP strives to work closely with governments and independent organizations located in its regions of study and to pursue extensive collaborative projects, such as through exchanges of researchers and the organizing of joint conferences.

The Institute holds firm to the conviction that an understanding of international affairs requires a deep and comprehensive knowledge of the culture and history of the regions and countries under study, and continuous interaction with a broad cross-section

of these societies.

Lastly, ISDP has an Internship Program for students and recent graduates to ensure long-term engagement and innovative understanding of regional Eurasian affairs.

2022 IN NUMBERS



Independent thinking, strategic solutions

VISION & MISSION

ISDP's mission is to promote an understanding of the nexus between conflict, security, and development in our regions of focus; inform and influence decision makers; provide analytical products and tools; and enable inclusive dialogue and debate.

ISDP's vision is to become a leading, inclusive, and independent platform for analysis, dialogue, and policy advice contributing to sustainable peace and development in its focus regions.

The Institute strongly believes in ethnic diversity, gender equality, and religious and political freedom and firmly stands by these values in all aspects of its work.



AN ELUSIVE PEACE

The Caucasus continued to see the development of a new regional situation following the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as a realignment of the region's politics appeared to take place. New tensions between the two states led to several additional skirmishes as Baku and Yerevan differed on the implementation of the November 2020 ceasefire. With Russia bogged down in Ukraine, its ability to influence events appeared to shrink. In particular, Western actors took a greater role in the effort to achieve a lasting peace agreement. The EU stepped up with Charles Michel, President of the European Council, taking a direct role in host-

ing top-level talks. The U.S. also contributed by supporting this dialogue, leading to hopes that an agreement was only months away. Still, regional powers made their voice heard. Turkey's support for Azerbaijan remains very strong, while Iran has objected to the prospect of a corridor linking Azerbaijan and Turkey, holding large-scale military maneuvers along Azerbaijan's border. Meanwhile, Georgia has focused on internal matters, after being denied candidate status to the EU, something Brussels accorded to Moldova and Ukraine. It remains to be seen whether Tbilisi will be willing to make the reforms needed to remedy this.

“


The current government will need to break this cycle if it wants to pave the way for Georgia's eventual EU membership...

CAUCASUS

ISDP continues to view the Caucasus as a key region, whose importance has increased further following the Ukraine war. The curtailment of transportation routes connecting Europe and Asia across Russia, coupled with the deterioration of the situation in Iran, leaves the Caucasus as the sole conduit linking Europe with the heart of the Eurasian continent. Building on this reality, ISDP strives to provide Western policymakers with a more nuanced understanding of developments in this key

region. A key project has been ISDP's effort to bring together scholars to analyze the implications of the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war on the Caucasus, an effort that is ongoing and nearing completion in the end of 2022. In parallel to this, ISDP has taken a more direct role in studying developments in Georgian society, as the country entered a new phase in its political development. The EU's decision to impose conditionality on Georgia for obtaining candidate status along with Moldo-

va and Ukraine creates a make-or-break situation for Tbilisi, which will force the government to show the extent of its determination to prioritize European integration. In this context, ISDP is working to shed light on the challenges Georgia faces and, not least, on the shifting moods of Georgian society.



14

Number of tankers in the Caspian Sea

25

Length in kilometers of the planned transportation corridor across Armenia linking Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan and Turkey

54

Number of Georgians and Azerbaijanis killed fighting for Ukraine, the two largest contingents

RUSSIA'S SOUTHERN NEIGHBORS TAKE A STAND

The Hill




"Ilham Aliyev, the President of Azerbaijan, ... urged his Ukrainian counterparts "never to agree to the violation of your territorial integrity."... Azerbaijan is the only regional state with some security protection, having signed a mutual defense treaty with NATO ally Turkey last June."

- Svante E. Cornell

GEORGIAN FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY IN UNCERTAIN TIMES

CACI Analyst



"Ruling regimes in Georgia have been reluctant to conduct reforms that would endanger their stay in power. If this trend continues it may further strengthen the cooling of relations between the West and Georgia. The current government will need to break this cycle if it wants to pave the way for Georgia's eventual EU membership."

- Kornely Kakachia



GROWING UNCERTAINTY

The Central Asian region saw an uptick in instability in 2022, beginning with rioting in Kazakhstan in the first days of the year, followed by escalation of border tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as unrest in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan in Uzbekistan.

Meanwhile, regional states sought to manage the regional fallout of the Russia-Ukraine war, seeking to distance themselves from Russia's invasion while avoiding being subjected to Russian punitive actions – and seeking to turbocharge efforts to develop the Trans-Caspian transport corridor. This balancing act

took place in the midst of an economic downturn and as countries recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic. In the midst of this, Central Asian leaders convened in the Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata in July to take concrete steps toward the institutionalization of regional cooperation in Central Asia. This major step, if implemented, is a direct response to the growing uncertainty surrounding the region, and will help the region withstand geopolitical shocks. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both embarked on constitutional reform agendas, as part of their effort to streamline government and make it more responsive to the needs of citizens.

“

... consign the region's ... states to the tender mercies of Russia or China...

CENTRAL ASIA

Responding to the rapidly shifting regional developments, ISDP has focused both on the internal change taking place in the region and on its external environment. The Institute continued its effort to analyze the reform processes in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It published studies on the January unrest in Kazakhstan, the political reforms that followed, and the government's emphasis on a social reform agenda. It also pooled a group of researchers to study the constitutional reforms in

Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, the Institute took an active role in studying the conflict dynamics of Central Asia and the efforts to strengthen the Trans-Caspian transport corridor. Focusing on shifting regional geopolitics, the Institute has sought to remedy the somewhat antiquated notions of power politics in Central Asia that appear to prevail by publishing a series of studies that provide an updated understanding of the approaches of regional powers, and equally importantly, an accurate

understanding of the substantial agency of the Central Asian states themselves, who are far from passive bystanders being acted upon, and in reality are very much active in shaping the geopolitics of their region.



200,000

Number of Russians entering Kazakhstan in two weeks following partial mobilization order

81

Official death toll of Kyrgyz-Tajik clashes in 2022

66.43%

voted for Sadar Japarov

RETHINKING GREATER CENTRAL ASIA: AMERICAN AND WESTERN STAKES

Silk Road Paper



“Washington and its allies ... if they allow transport corridors from Central Asia to the South to remain closed and undeveloped,... consign the region’s five sovereign states to the tender mercies of Russia or China.”

- S. Frederick Starr

LEARNING FROM KAZAKHSTAN’S JANUARY CRISIS

CACI Analyst



“A key change in focus developed after Mr. Tokayev acceded to the presidency: ... political reform - particularly focusing on the rule of law and anti-corruption...was necessary for Kazakhstan’s future...”

- Soante E. Cornell



EURASIAN AGENDA SETTER

The Ukraine war has reinforced Turkey's preference for strategic autonomy and heightened its geopolitical profile. Turkish drones have been critical to Ukraine's war effort, while Turkey has maintained its close economic relations with Russia. Walking a fine line between Ukraine and Russia, Turkey has won praise from all sides for its mediation efforts. Meanwhile, the new strategic partnership that has been forged between Turkey and Uzbekistan anchors Ankara's geopolitical and economic outreach across the Caspian Basin to Central Asia. The new comprehensive strategic part-

nership between Turkey and Uzbekistan, the two most populous members of the Organization of Turkic States, serves to actualize the pan-Eurasian scope of the regional formation. Further underscoring Turkey's rise as a Eurasian agenda setter, Turkey aims to develop its military relations with Pakistan. Taking advantage of Russia's preoccupation with Ukraine and its war-induced weakness, Turkey is pushing for gains in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which aligns Turkey with the Western strategic interest in rolling back Russia. Turkey is hopeful of increased se-

“


Turkey is diplomatically strengthened by the Ukraine War...

curity cooperation with Europe and the U.S. However, the importance of the problems that have bedeviled Turkey's relations with other Western powers in recent years – Turkey's purchase of Russian ground-to air missiles and U.S. support for PKK affiliates in Syria – has not diminished.

TURKEY

ISDP has long aspired to help Western policy-makers understand Turkish domestic and foreign policies. The *Turkey Analyst* has, with its wide range of Turkish as well as non-Turkish contributors, provided context and analysis to developments in Turkey since it was launched in 2008. ISDP endeavors to pay attention to different topics and highlight deeper currents in Turkish politics that tend to be overlooked in the standard media and academic narrative. The *Turkey Analyst* has continued to bring attention to social and labor

issues that are otherwise neglected in international analyses of Turkey, as well as to the internal power dynamics that shape Turkey's domestic and foreign policies. In-depth analyses in *Turkey Analyst* has showed how Turkey is emerging as a key agenda setter in Eurasia, and has elaborated on the rationale behind Turkish strategy and on how the Ukraine war impacts on Turkey's relations with Ukraine, Russia, and the West.



85%

Inflation rate in Turkey

2,123

Firms operating in Uzbekistan with Turkish capital

56%

Russian share of Turkey's grain imports

TURKEY AND THE UKRAINE WAR: ANKARA CHARTS ITS OWN COURSE

Turkey Analyst



"Turkey is diplomatically strengthened by the Ukraine War, reinforcing and seemingly validating the "strategic autonomy within NATO" course that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pursued in recent years."

- Alan Makovsky

NEW TURKEY-UZBEKISTAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP ACCELERATES TURKEY'S RISE

Turkey Analyst



"Tashkent has turned to Ankara to act as a countervailing force in both economic and security affairs. Combined with the expanding Turkey-Pakistan strategic partnership, this makes Turkey a rising Eurasian agenda setter."

- Michaël Tanchum



MOUNTING THREAT TO TAIWAN

The year 2022 was marked by increasing international tension, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's mounting pressure on Taiwan as two major issues. The leaders in Beijing and Moscow were united in their view of the U.S. as their main enemy, while describing their own relationship in terms of limitless friendship. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait continued to build up and reached a high point in connection with U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei in August. The threat to Taiwan's de facto independence seemed to be mounting. China continued to make headlines

with its poor human rights record and harsh pandemic lockdowns, but also with hosting the Winter Olympics. The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in November was a complete victory for Xi Jinping, who contrary to earlier practice was re-elected General Secretary for a third term. Under his leadership, one can expect a continued focus on strengthening control over all sectors of Chinese society as well as on playing an increasingly assertive role on the global scene. During the coming year, this is likely to lead to mounting tensions both with the United States and with Europe.

“

There won't be major shifts in Taiwan's foreign policy...

CHINA

During 2022, ISDP's Stockholm China Center continued to pursue research and analysis, host public events, and participate in European policy discussions. Through joint projects and proceedings, it maintained its contacts with established partners and also built new partnerships. Throughout the year, the Center hosted numerous webinars and in-person discussions. These included a two-day virtual Taiwan-Nordic Forum, lectures and webinars on Taiwan's local elections and foreign policy and on Taiwanese identities, on the situation in Hong Kong, Sino-German relations, and

the Twentieth Party Congress in China. In collaboration with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Center held a launch event for a comprehensive review of China's Polar Silk Road. Speakers were engaged from Taiwan, Germany, the UK, and Sweden. Most events were broadcast live and remain accessible to the public through ISDP's social media channels. In addition to both virtual and in-person events, the China Center has contributed to ongoing academic, policy, and public debates. Its staff members participated in live discussions, seminars and conferences, authored commentaries,

and appeared in the media. This year's thematic focus was on the current state of Cross-Strait relations, Taiwan's role in international affairs, the Communist Party, and China's foreign policy.



3.2%

China GDP growth in 2022

230,000

People left Hong Kong between 2019 and 2022

49

Chinese fighter jets crossed the Taiwan Strait

CHINA'S POLAR SILK ROAD REVISITED

Asia Paper



"Arctic governance will therefore entail coming to terms with China's presence as an actor to be reckoned with."

- Larissa Stünkel

TAIWAN'S KMT HAS A MOUNTAIN TO CLIMB FOR 2024 PRESIDENTIAL RACE

Nikkei Asia



"There won't be major shifts in Taiwan's foreign policy, because the local elections are neither a rebuke nor an affirmation on the country's international relations."

- Bo-jiun Jing



ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY

Four specific trends have dominated the Indo-Pacific region in the year 2022: (a) Intensification of major power rivalry, primarily between the U.S. and China, (b) revival of historical animosity and conflict threatening full-fledged war, (c) growing clouds over land and maritime conflicts involving territorial integrity and sovereignty, and (d) furthering of regional free trade agreements or mechanisms leading to regional economic cooperation. U.S.- China rivalry has been growing as evidenced by speeches and statements and is likely to continue in the year 2023.

Russia's attack on Ukraine has not only revived the historical animosity among powers but also furthered the divide between the authoritarian and democratic world. Neither has the China-India boundary dispute found a credible solution, nor have the politics surrounding the sovereignty of Taiwan died down. China's assertive approach towards the Taiwan issue, boundary dispute with India, including its assertive maritime posturing from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean have only made the Indo-Pacific a highlighted region. Amid this power rivalry

“

China's balancing strategy may be... a limiting factor in China-Russia relations...

and politics, the arrival of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework complicates the regional economic environment with several existing multilateral economic frameworks like the RCEP and CPTPP.

INDO-PACIFIC

The Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs has focused on analyzing existing conflicts in the region while highlighting the trends and the politics that may influence the year 2023 and beyond. While the Center has, on the one hand, tried to analyze the stance and perspective on the Russia-Ukraine war of major Indo-Pacific powers (such as Japan, India, and the U.S.), research has equally focused on how and where existing gaps between Europe and the Indo-Pacific can be bridged. Policy papers explain how the EU can have a more deliberative engagement and part-

nership with India, Japan, ASEAN, the U.S. as well as with the Indo-Pacific as a whole; also, if and how a context can be built to promote a credible partnership between NATO and Indo-Pacific mechanisms like the Quad and AUKUS. The Center's publications have also highlighted the challenges, drawbacks, and opportunities in EU-India existing relations. Attempt has been made to analyze India's relationship with specific mainstream EU countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands, which already have their own Indo-Pacific policies. Another focus of the Center has been the current

and future potential of the relationship between India and the Nordic countries, for which a specific bimonthly newsletter has been launched.



300

PLA flights cross Taiwan Strait median in August

\$1.5bn

Worth U.S. arms sale to Taiwan in 2022

5th

India's rank among world economies

TAIWAN IN THE EUROPEAN DISCOURSE: TOWARD POLITICAL CONSENSUS?

Issue Brief



"... there is still a great deal that democracies need to understand about the nature and deterrent effect that Chinese economic coercion may have on third countries, and on the relationship between power and vulnerability."

- Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy

THE RUSSIA-INDIA-CHINA TRILATERAL AFTER UKRAINE: WILL BEIJING TAKE THE LEAD?

Journal Article



"...China's balancing strategy may be - at least to some extent - a limiting factor in China-Russia relations and impact their interactions within the Russia, India, and China strategic triangle."

- Panda & Paik



A NEW REALITY

Japan's geopolitical environment presented new challenges in 2022. China continued its military build-up and repeatedly stated that it has the right to incorporate Taiwan with military means, if necessary. This, Japanese government representatives have pointed out, would pose an immediate threat to Japan's security. The southernmost islands of Japan are very close to Taiwan and a Chinese invasion would be hard to carry through without violating Japanese waters. The Chinese military exercises encircling Taiwan in August also saw Chinese ballistic missiles fired into Japa-

nese waters and probably aimed at warning Japan of the risks of being dragged into any future conflict. Japan's response has been to increase military spending and cooperate even closer with the United States. The Russian invasion of Ukraine led to strong condemnations from Japan and a worsening of bilateral relations between Japan and Russia. Hopes for the return of the Northern Territories, occupied by Russia since the end of World War II, have been quenched. This, on the other hand, has made it possible for Japan to be less limited in its criticism of Russian viola-

“

Japan's economic interests will be at stake...

tions of international law. North Korea has continued its illegal firing of missiles in the vicinity of Japan and has not shown any sign of wishing to improve its bilateral relations with Japan. This has only strengthened Japanese resolve to defend both democracy and the principles of international law.

JAPAN

The Japan Center has continued to expand its cooperation with other international institutes and organizations, such as the Sweden-Japan Foundation (SJF), the Scandinavia-Japan Sasakawa Foundation (SJSF), the Kajima Institute for International Peace (KIIP) and the International Institute for Media and Women's Studies (IIMWS). The Japan Center is also in close cooperation with the newly established Japan House Scandinavia, with the aim of strengthening the Swedish-Japanese network and creating a hub for bilateral cooperation also in the Swedish city of

Malmö. The Japan Center has continued to hold webinars and seminars, and publish issue briefs, weekly newsletters and blog posts, in addition to other publications. The Center is an active participant in the popular podcast "Japanpodden". In addition, the Center has increased its cultural activities and was instrumental in organizing meetings and seminars in connection with the visit by the well-known Japanese writer Yû Miri.



2.5%

Unemployment
(August 2022)

3%

Annual inflation rate
(in September 2022)

Over 6

tn yen (\$43 bn) Defense
budget for fiscal 2023

JAPAN'S HISTORIC MOMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES NECESSITATE POLICY EVOLUTION

Issue Brief



"Japan's economic interests will be at stake if U.S.-China relations should deteriorate further."

- Lars Vargö

JAPAN'S HISTORIC MOMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES NECESSITATE POLICY EVOLUTION

Issue Brief



"Neither Japan nor the rest of the free world can afford to have Japan being constrained by an outdated constitution."

- Lars Vargö



GROWING TENSIONS

Despite only having reported its first virus case three months prior, North Korea declared triumph over COVID-19 in August 2022. The DPRK enacted a new law affirming its right to employ preemptive nuclear attacks to defend itself and emphasizing the “irreversibility” of its status as a nuclear state. To date, Pyongyang has carried out more than 70 missile tests, showing significant improvement in its missile program and a more confrontational stance toward Washington. Despite military advancements, the domestic situation in the DPRK has worsened,

as stated by Kim Jong Un himself throughout 2022, due to the compounded effect of sanctions, pandemic prevention measures, its eventual breakout, and natural disasters. On its part, South Korea held presidential elections this year where People Power Party nominee Yoon Suk-yeol won. The ROK has used its substantial financial resources to build a more sophisticated and capable military and increased its defense expenditure from \$38.2 billion in 2018 to \$48.3 billion in 2022. Additionally, the ROK has resumed most joint ROK-U.S. military drills and participat-

“

... strengthening ties with Pyongyang a higher priority than denuclearization...


ed in the first trilateral naval drills with the U.S. and Japan. Feeling increasingly pressured by the worsening Sino-American competition, Seoul is gradually reviewing its hedging stance between Washington and Beijing. To end its economic overdependence on China, the ROK joined the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and participated in the Chip 4 alliance preliminary meetings.

KOREA

The ISDP Korea Center has made progress toward its key goals during 2022 by broadening the scope of its activities and addressing matters of long-term peace and development on the Korean Peninsula to maintain its position as the main hub for policy-oriented Korea Studies in the Nordic region. The Center has continued its guest researcher program, inviting long- and short-term fellows from both Koreas actively. Additionally, the Center has expanded its network of influential parties with vested interests in issues relating to Korea, such as the peace process and security concerns on the Peninsula.

Through three multilateral dialogues, a few private roundtables and lectures, and guest researchers' knowledge exchange sessions, the Center addressed security and development-related issues on the Peninsula. Topics concerning women, peace, and security were explored at a conference organized jointly with the Korea Women's Development Institute. In collaboration with the Korea Foundation, the Center arranged a fellowship program allowing Nordic journalists to gain a better understanding of Korea by attending two training sessions in Stockholm and a field trip to Seoul. A

lecture on Korean unification was organized with a guest researcher in cooperation with Stockholm University. Additionally, the Center invited representatives from different Korean and Nordic organizations for a webinar on green financing.



\$48.3 bn

ROK military expenditure

2

ROK-U.S. large-scale military exercises

70+

DPRK missile tests

NORTH KOREA IS JOINING CHINA AND RUSSIA IN CONFRONTING THE US

38 North



“Beijing and Moscow are willing, for now, to make strengthening ties with Pyongyang a higher priority than denuclearization, to deter the expansion of America and its allies in the region.”

- Sangsoo Lee

1325 NAPS BEYOND EAST AND WEST: INSTITUTIONALIZING THE WPS AGENDA IN SWEDEN AND SOUTH KOREA

Focus Asia



“Because a lack of awareness and knowledge about the profitability of gender equality in general and the importance of WPS in particular are fundamental obstacles to the South Korean NAP's success, awareness-raising and a change in norms must be pursued concurrently.”

- Liljeström & Yoon

ORGANIZATION

ISDP BOARD

The ISDP Board consists of high-level professionals and convenes three to five times a year.

Anna Wieslander

Chairman of the Board

*Director for Northern Europe,
Atlantic Council*

Jan Mörtberg

Deputy Chairman of the Board

*Member of the Royal Swedish Academy of
War Sciences*

Katarina Areskoug

Director at Kreab

Jakob Kiefer

Group Head of Public Affairs, ABB Group

Olof Ehrenkrona

CEO at Stockholms Hjärnverk AB

Per Storm

*General Manager and Managing Director,
EIT RawMaterials North AB*

ISDP OFFICE

Niklas Swanström is the Executive Director and Svante Cornell is the Director of the Institute, while Tasmin Hoque is the Chief Financial Officer. ISDP's main office is located at Västra Finnbodavägen 2, Nacka, Stockholm, Sweden. In 2022, ISDP consisted of 18 staff members, 12 men and 6 women.

RECRUITMENT

During 2022, ISDP had the pleasure of recruiting the following new staff members:

Jagannath Panda

*Head of the Stockholm Center
for South Asian and Indo-Pacific
Affairs & Editor*

Elin Eriksson

Project Coordinator

Peter Adolfsson

Junior Research Fellow

Bo-jiun Jing

Research Fellow

INTERNSHIP PROGRAM

Each semester ISDP accepts four to eight interns from all over the world to assist in the work of the Institute. The ISDP internship program offers the interns work experience in an international environment, encourages them to write and publish with staff members, and shoulder progressive responsibilities within the organization. During 2022, the 13 individuals from 8 countries enrolled in the internship program were:

Yi-Chieh Chen

Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs

Maximilian Dippold

Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs

Markus Hietanen

Stockholm China Center

Meriel Lee

Stockholm Korea Center

Gabriela McQuinty Cañete

Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs

Zack Nhan

Stockholm China Center

Isak Nordenberg

Stockholm Japan Center

Josephine Ørgaard Riis Rasmussen

Asia Program

Simmi Saini Wittläck

Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs

Danylo Stonis

Asia Program

William Winberg

Stockholm Japan Center

Martha Woods

Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs

Carlotta Young-Mi Bischke

Stockholm Korea Center

VISITING FELLOWS PROGRAM

ISDP regularly invites visiting fellows to undertake research at the Institute. The Visiting Fellows Program provides opportunities for professional development to scholars and other specialists and networking opportunities in Sweden. During their stay, fellows conduct research on a topic related to the Institute's core areas. Through 2022 the following individuals participated in the Visiting Fellows Program:

Khurram Maqsood Ahmed

Federal Government Department of Pakistan

Hyun-Jeong Lee

Prior to her stay at ISDP: Busan Daily News, South Korea

Sang-Yoon Ma

Catholic University of Korea, South Korea

Sara Naqvi

Federal Government Department of Pakistan

Ra Jong-Yil

Gachon University, South Korea

Aniruddha Saha

King's College London, United Kingdom

Yejin Shin

Prior to her stay at ISDP: Ministry of Health and Welfare, South Korea

FINANCIAL REVIEW

INCOME

The Institute has successfully maintained a diversified income base, with a total revenue of 16,5 MSEK. Funding from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs accounted for around 40 percent of the total revenue. 2 percent of the revenue is linked to the Institute's taxable operations.

COSTS

During 2022, the focus has been on continued cost control. The Institute's greatest asset is its human resources. Personnel costs therefore continue to be a large part of the Institute's overall budget. It is vital that the Institute continues and develops this primary resource to maintain its current position as an attractive think tank for Swedish and international funders.

RESULT

For 2022 the Institute has a positive result of 188 TSEK.

LOOKING AHEAD

The Institute's long-term budget and prognosis indicates that activities can proceed with continued effective results. ISDP will continue to focus on a diversified funding and create long-term, stable relationships with all stakeholders, as well as consistently aim to achieve high-quality outputs. Funding from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Korea Foundation, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, amongst others, will continue into 2023.

AUDITOR

The auditor of ISDP is Micaela Karlström at MOORE Allegretto.

FIVE-YEAR FINANCIAL OVERVIEW

	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018
Income*	16 547 140	14 277 085	12 999 133	13 319 078	14 276 102
Expenses**	16 358 975	14 122 072	12 900 115	13 175 042	14 144 056
Reported Results	188 165	155 013	99 018	144 036	132 046

*Incoming Resources including Revenue, Government Grant and Other Grants

**Resources Expended including Result (EBIT), Financial Revenue and costs, Appropriations and Tax

INCOME STATEMENT

	2022	2021
Revenue	483 447	1 726 907
Government Grants	10 483 263	8 288 465
Other Grants	5 580 430	4 261 713
<i>Total</i>	16 547 140	14 277 085
Costs		
Personnel Costs	-10 947 220	-10 109 517
Other Costs	- 5 340 687	-3 834 508
Result (EBITDA)	259 233	333 060
Depreciation	-73 926	-195 492
Result (EBIT)	185 307	137 568
Interest, interest cost etc.	2 858	17 445
Tax	-	-
Net Result	188 165	155 013

BALANCE SHEET

ASSETS	2022-12-31	2021-12-31
<i>Fixed Assets</i>		
Inventories	0	0
<i>Total</i>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
<i>Current Assets</i>		
Account receivables	29 168	-
Other receivables	-	-
Prepaid expenses and accrued income	655 067	503 334
Liquid assets	3 104 885	2 693 485
<i>Total</i>	<u>3 789 120</u>	<u>3 196 819</u>
TOTAL ASSETS	3 789 120	3 196 819

LIABILITIES AND EQUITY

<i>Current Liabilities</i>		
Accounts payable	519 375	122 808
Tax liabilities	53 734	38 787
Prepaid income	977 251	1 173 700
Other current liabilities	476 964	354 354
Interim liabilities	1 153 830	1 087 370
<i>Total</i>	<u>3 181 154</u>	<u>2 777 019</u>
<i>Equity</i>	<u>607 966</u>	<u>419 800</u>
<i>Total</i>	607 966	419 800
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND EQUITY	3 789 120	3 196 819

FUNDERS IN 2022

ISDP's work is strengthened by engaging with funders, who share the Institute's interests in interpreting and informing the policy debate. The support provided by funders to the Institute is invaluable and allows ISDP to expand and improve its work, and to sustain its independence. ISDP acknowledges and appreciates the funders' support and are humbled by their confidence in the Institute's work. ISDP seeks to cooperate with its funders concerning projects and deliverables. Nonetheless, ISDP does not accept influence or instructions by funders with regard to content or conclusions drawn in its analytical work or concerning the division of responsibilities in ongoing projects.

This list includes core funding and project support, as well as commercial contracts during the course of 2022.

FUNDERS

Embassy of India to Sweden & Latvia
The Development Strategy Center Uzbekistan
Japan Bank for International Cooperation
Kajima International Institute of Peace
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
Korea Foundation
Korean Women's Development Institute
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kazakhstan
North West Construction, Inc.
One Stop Print General Trading LLC
Organisation for Research on China and Asia
Scandinavia-Japan Sasakawa Foundation
Taipei Mission in Sweden
Taiwan Foundation for Democracy
United States Institute of Peace (USIP)

IMAGE CREDIT

Front page: Gamla Stan, the old part of Stockholm, Sweden, by Sergii Figurnyi, licenced under Shutterstock Editorial License.

Page 1: Business map of Asia - Modern design with polygonal shapes on dark blue background, simple vector illustration for web sitedesign, digital technology concept, by Nook Hok, licenced under Shutterstock Editorial License.

Page 4: Aerial photography of mountain ridge photo – Free Nature Image on Unsplash by Patrick Schneider, Unsplash.

Page 6: Yurt in a landscape of Kazakhstan, by Aureliy, licenced under Shutterstock Editorial License.

Page 8: Red flag on top of brown concrete building during daytime photo – Free Image on Unsplash Meg Jerrad, Unsplash.

Page 10: Beijing / China - November 26 2015: Red banners atop The National People's Congress, the national legislature of the People's Republic of China, largest parliament in the world, with 2,980 members, by Mirco Kuzmanovic, licenced under Shutterstock Editorial License.

Page 12: Aerial view of a coastline where the green forest jungle meets the white sand and clear blue water of Padang Padang, Bali Indonesia, by ollivves, licenced under Shutterstock Editorial License.

Page 14: Tokyo, Japan - View of Shibuya Crossing, one of the busiest crossings in the world., by Sean Pavone, licenced under Shutterstock Editorial License.

Page 16: Panmunjom, North Korea, 2015 - The Joint Security Area and border in Panmunjom - View from South Korea, by Rainer Hesse, licenced under Shutterstock Editorial License.

Icons are from Flaticon and were designed by the following artists:

Anditii Creative, Assia Benkerroum, Eucalyp, Freepik, geotatah, GOWI, Icongeek26, justicon, kosonicon, Linector, manshagraphics, monkik, nawicon, Parzival' 1997, Payungkead, Pixel perfect, Ranah Pixel Studio, sbh graphics, Smashicons, surang

All are licenced under Flaticon Basic License.

Institute for Security and Development Policy

Västra Finnbodavägen 2

131 30 Nacka

Sweden

www.isdp.eu

info@isdp.eu

[@ISDP_Sweden](https://www.instagram.com/ISDP_Sweden)